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1. A New Zeitgeist
“Not the Black Death, this time; the Gray Life”.
Huxley 1962: 59
Fig. 1: Prevalence of the use of the word “zombie” from 1920–2008 in 
predominantly English books published in any country.1
Fig. 2: Zombie Walk Mexico (2011). Photo by Munir Hamdan.2
1  From Google N-Gram Viewer (Michel et al. 2011).
2  Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://bit.ly/2pcvULo
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In 2001, a very peculiar performance art begins to take place across North 
America. It occurs first in Sacramento, California and again two years 
later in Toronto, Ontario. By 2008, it starts recurring annually in certain 
urban centers, grows steadily with each passing year, and spreads 
from one city to the next. Sometimes it has fewer than 50 participants. 
Sometimes it has over 1000. In late 2011, Mexico City boasts a record 
of 9,000. Some gatherings are meticulous and coordinated, others are 
impromptu. Some participants join in advance, and many decide to 
follow spontaneously. Before long, the phenomenon begins to spread 
around the globe.
Fig. 3: “I thought that beauty alone would satisfy. But the soul is gone. 
I can’t bear those empty, staring eyes”. Screenshot from the Halperin 
brothers’ 1932 film, White Zombie, at 40:11.3
It should surprise us that these “walks” have only begun to appear, 
when the paradigm for their behavior has existed since the Halperin 
brothers produced White Zombie in 1932. In this film, a young man 
turned voodoo master transforms a young woman into a subordinate, 
pale-skinned corpse. Though his motive is initially to gain her love, his 
magic succeeds only in removing her vitality. This ironic consequence 
comes to effect change in his intentions, and he repents to her: “I thought 
that beauty alone would satisfy. But the soul is gone. I can’t bear those 
empty, staring eyes”. It is a mark of how the zombie has developed over 
the years that the word “beauty” could ever have been used to describe it.
3  A remastered version of the movie is available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=lQ0hL4EBC58
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The outbreak of zombieism is a twentieth century phenomenon, but 
in the twenty-first century it explodes into zeitgeist. Over 600 zombie 
movies have been made since 1920, but over one half of them have been 
in the last 10 years. Two great waves have lapped onto the shore of 
American cinema since 2000: one around 2001, and then again in 2008.4 
Twenty-Eight Days Later comes out in 2002, George Romero’s Dawn of the 
Dead is remade in 2004, and Zombieland becomes the highest-grossing 
zombie film to date in 2009. This is quickly overtaken in 2013, first by 
Warm Bodies, and then by the Brad Pitt epic, World War Z.5 By 2015, there 
are three TV series based on zombies: Z Nation on Netflix, iZombie on 
CW, and AMC’s breakthrough hit, The Walking Dead.6 The genre has 
also enjoyed considerable success in the medium of video games, most 
notably in the highly lauded The Last of Us.7
Clearly, the zombie has transcended the constraints of its own genre. 
Whereas early zombie films closely adhered to horror tropes, more recent 
renditions have wed themselves to comedy and romance (Zack Snyder 
released the comedic Shaun of the Dead in 2004 to critical and popular 
acclaim),8 and broken away from melodrama. The zombie has become a 
pervasive cultural symbol that is constantly expanding its reference, not 
content to relegate itself to its tradition. As Deleuze and Guattari (1972: 
332) put it “the only modern myth is the myth of zombies”. The zombie 
seems to be a shifting signifier with an unending hermeneutical compass. 
And yet its features remain remarkably consistent from one story to the 
next, and it has represented many varieties of apocalypse without altering 
its basic nature: consumerism, poverty, hunger, political dystopia and 
4  Annalee Newitz (2008), “War and Social Upheaval Cause Spikes in Zombie Movie 
Production”, i09.com
5  Trailers available on YouTube: Twenty-Eight Days Later at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=c7ynwAgQlDQ; Dawn of the Dead at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
-IIwV_Y6VU; Zombieland at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8m9EVP8X7N8; 
Warm Bodies at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvjwKqA2_9U; World War Z 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HcwTxRuq-uk
6  Trailers are available on YouTube: Z Nation at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7ZFIS2AqAz8; iZombie (Season 1) at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UndyIFo_jZ4; The Walking Dead (Season 1) at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=sfAc2U20uyg
7  The trailer of The Last of Us is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OQWD5W3fpPM
8  The trailer of Shaun of the Dead is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=LIfcaZ4pC-4
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environmental degradation, zombies have assumed a heterogeneity of 
ugliness. No longer simply a vehicle for entertainment, it has become 
the basis for critical reflection and cultural self-examination, to which an 
increasing number of academic publications on the subject attest (Goto-
Jones 2015; Moreman 2010; Webb and Byrnand 2008). For instance, 
Television Ontario devoted an episode of The Agenda with Steve Paikin 
in 2011 to an unreserved examination of humanity’s most nauseating 
adversary. Four panelists―Daniel Drezner, Arnold T. Blumberg, Robert 
Smith and Andrew Watson―sat down to parse its menaces and flesh out 
its metaphors. Zombies have pressed us with the dangers of a unique 
moment in time, and they have become the most enduring, expressive 
and consummate metaphor for our crisis in meaning.
The zombie has been subject to a vast variety of interpretations by 
culture theorists and academics. To examine these exhaustively would 
be beyond the scope of this or any other monograph. The affinity 
between zombies and states of human decrepitude has permitted the 
view that zombies can stand for nearly every conceivable human failing. 
The present authors propose that the interpretations most favoured by 
academics―mortality, consumerism and environmental degradation 
among them―are plausible without being sufficient. The mere fact that 
each seems to apply invalidates the proposition that any one of them can 
apply exclusively. We take the position that this exegetic pigeonholing 
often falls deftly into the “forest for the trees” category of thinking. The 
zombie zeitgeist accommodates interpretations of disquiet about many 
topics, yet we will argue that each of these readings should be understood 
as elements of a broader symptomatology. This symptomatology, we 
will explain, relates to a condition that is far more complex than has 
been supposed by any theorist that has previously written on this topic.
We propose that the cultural phenomenon of the zombie has provided 
us with a constellation of four intersecting symbols for a modern 
human ethos, and that these symbols represent a crisis of worldview 
that has no precedent in modern western civilization. Our use of the 
collective pronoun “we” shall be in broad reference to North-American 
and Western culture more generally. This limitation notwithstanding, 
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the authors will make no claims regarding the applicability of these 
arguments to cultures that may fall outside of that moniker.9
In this book we will suggest that the appearance of these zombie 
symbols is approximately co-emergent with the West’s dawning 
cultural awareness of a worldview crisis, and that there are sufficient 
correlations between the traits of the zombie and the symptomology 
of the crisis to demonstrate this linkage reliably. We will provide a 
preliminary discussion of the origins of the crisis (the full argument 
will be reserved for forthcoming work), and argue that it is extant in 
the personal, social, political and religious domains of life in which we 
participate, and which define us uniquely as a meaning-making species.
In the forthcoming sections, we will also argue that while the zombie is 
a versatile enough symbol to stand for many kinds of human defilement, 
the symbol ultimately draws its aptness from being a perversion of the 
Christian mythos of death and resurrection, and that most of its traits 
and features have emerged from, and harken back to, the matrix of the 
Christian worldview. We will contend that the zombie has evolved to 
become a representation of the loss of the sacred canopy traditionally 
provided by Christianity, and that its features have evolved along the 
fault lines of this loss, representing a world that no longer explains itself, 
nor provides us instruction for how to live within it.
Section 2 will retrace the genealogy of the zombie from its precursory 
influences and the peak popularity that began at the turn of this century. 
We will also discuss how the zombie replaced the extra-terrestrials to 
become the preeminent monster for the twenty-first century, reflecting 
the weariness and alienation left by the Cold War and the threat of 
nuclear apocalypse.
Section 3 will provide the main exegesis of the zombie itself, 
separating its myth into four predominant symbols that are recurrent 
in its popular depictions in film, television, and other literature. These 
symbols will not simply be icons associated with the zombie’s image; 
9  It will be apparent throughout the monograph that our reference to ‘the West’ 
is invoked with predominantly American examples. As the US is the most 
significant exporter of popular culture in the West, our focus on American culture 
is proportionate to its contribution to the phenomenon. Though this does 
not necessarily suggest that the phenomenon is absent from other western 
countries, America certainly seems to be the epicenter of the crisis, and most 
exemplary of its features.
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they will be the zombie’s physical attributes, the treatment of its name, 
contortions of its narrative structure and the ecology of apocalypse that 
invariably follows it from one story to the next.
Section 4 will introduce the concept of cultural domicide (the 
destruction of home) by exploring two chronologically distant but 
revealing case studies examining the loss of home on a cultural scale. 
The first of these will refer the Grassy Narrows First Nation in Ontario, 
Canada, and the second to the decline of the Hellenistic civilization 
following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. This section 
will depart from discussions of the zombie to build a framework for 
worldview attunement that will inform the discussions in the remaining 
sections.
Section 5 will discuss the symptomatology of this crisis in detail 
using the four horsemen of the Christian apocalypse as an analogue 
for the four domains affected by the meaning crisis. Famine, Pestilence, 
War and Death will stand for the personal, social, political and religious 
manifestations of the crisis, framed by the loss of worldview introduced 
in the previous section.
Section 6 will offer an overview of the historical origins of the 
meaning crisis, tracing the rise and fall of a western worldview that 
was composed of three constellating orders from the Aristotelean 
and Christian paradigms. This introductory genealogy will chronicle 
the emergence of our cultural domicide throughout the centuries, an 
argument that will be elaborated in forthcoming work.
Though we will subdivide the representational corpus of the zombie 
zeitgeist into different symbols in section 3, and the symptoms in section 
5, we will also refer to the amalgam of zombie phenomena as a single 
symbol for the purpose of surveying these phenomena collectively. 
There are two fundamental claims that we will introduce hereto and 
reiterate throughout this book. The first is that, by almost all accounts, 
zombies are the fictionally distorted, self-reflected image of modern 
humanity. Most zombie interpretations begin with this premise, that 
in some pivotal way, “zombies are us” (see e.g., Goto-Jones 2015, 
Moreman 2010, Webb and Byrnand 2008). This book will seek to add 
valence and depth to this proposition. Zombies do represent us, but 
more specifically, they represent the ruin of all that is meaningful within 
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us. Zombies represent the modern deterioration of our uniquely human 
ability to make and sustain meaning in our lives.
The second conclusion is that the zombie zeitgeist is a powerful but 
inarticulate form of representation. It is a raw opus of pop art, and it 
is not replete with self-analysis. The main function of zombie symbol 
seems to express the meaning crisis, not to treat or explain it. Naturally 
then, our aim here is to buffer the gaps within the zombie’s expression 
with the evaluation required to appreciate its gravity. This is our 
undertaking in the forthcoming sections.

2. A Transition in Metaphors:  
A Brief History of Monster Zeitgeists
We are surrounded by strangers. But for stretches of our history, strangers 
have not been as strange as they are now. There have been epochs of 
culture when we have sustained a concerted frame of reference that 
made us known and knowable to one another wherever we lived. Even 
when we shared very little, we could be sure to find some universal 
commons that would guarantee us familiarity with an unfamiliar person. 
For much of our recent past, we in the West lived all under the canopy 
of Christendom. However varied or populated our society was, other 
human beings always offered a degree of predictability as long as they 
identified as Christians. We could always anticipate a median grade of 
behavior, and presuppose binary limits on a spectrum between the sacred 
and the profane.1 Sustaining our religious commons was not as much 
about celebrating common principles as much as it was about extending 
our scope of acquaintance. The “extended family” metaphors used in 
religious discourse were very provident in fostering this acquaintance. 
Strangeness was never absolute strangeness, and we could find others 
intelligible to the degree that they assured a comprehensible―if not 
always amiable―interaction. More contemporary cultural canopies 
came in the form of ethnic or civic membership, but because citizenship 
1  We are not implying that these expectations were qualified, or that everyone did in 
fact adhere to a certain standard of virtue. What we are referring to is merely the 
perception of this standard, not its reality. 
© 2017 J. Vervaeke, C. Mastropietro, F. Miscevic, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0113.02
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and ethnicity are often more involuntary, they are not as grounded in 
principled participation. They are not as comprehensively penetrating, 
and therefore less powerful than religious bonds. Thus, they are much 
more susceptible to the vicissitudes of political and economic change. 
One of the more puissant cultural canopies in the twentieth century 
was the phenomenon of “Americanism”. Particularly in the latter half 
of the century, being American connoted a strong apotheosis of values 
and perspective for most Americans. In most cases, if two Americans 
had diverging interests, backgrounds or orientations, they could be 
sure to touch base on certain convictions held mutually fundamental. 
Significantly, many attribute the vitality of Americanness to the 
influence of a vernacular religiosity―the “faith in America”.
Yet, as Dreyfus and Kelly (2011) observe, we no longer share a 
uniform worldview that guarantees agreement on sacredness or 
standards of behavior. We are talking about a changing worldview, 
rather than a single event or moment in history. This has been a gradual 
process. Now, the powerful twentieth century “Americanism” is nearly 
a misnomer; two persons can share its title and share almost nothing 
else. The alienation we feel in everyday life suggests that experiences 
of foreignness―exposure to “otherness” of persons or place―are 
becoming inherent in domestic life. This dovetails with burgeoning 
literature discussing the disintegration of social candor, “common 
courtesy” and the sense of locality that made America perceive itself 
as a neighborhood of frankness and fluid exchange. Public intimacy is 
what is at stake, the feeling of recognition; understanding, and being 
understood, by other human beings.
Zombies are not the first monsters to broach this theme. By and large, 
they have taken over from a villain H. G. Wells introduced in his 1898 
novel War of the Worlds that has inspired numerous film adaptations since 
its original publication.2 Extra-terrestrial invasions gained tremendous 
popularity in American cinema, particularly in the latter half of the 
twentieth century with the onset of the Cold War. As the West drew its 
cultural boundaries more guardedly, the alien seemed to be an effective 
mask for the prevailing wind of wariness and paranoia, and the fear 
of outsiders and espionage. Stories of alien invasion struck compelling 
2  The trailer of War of the Worlds is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.
com/results?search_query=war+of+the+worlds+trailer
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affinities with real-life suspicions: adversaries from the outside were 
trying to infiltrate our society in order to advance theirs, to dissolve our 
systems and propagate their own, and to estrange us from one another 
by diluting our fellowship. These suspicions were significant in that 
they inadvertently discouraged intimacy; people were not guaranteed 
to be trustworthy, many were not who they said they were, and it was 
difficult to gauge a stranger’s memberships and commitments. It was 
possible that your new friend was not the “American” she said she was, 
and that she had come under the canopy to sabotage its integrity. One 
of the most dramatic fictionalizations of this kind of mania was depicted 
in a famous episode of The Twilight Zone,3 where a few well-disguised 
aliens interfered with technology to cause an outbreak of disquiet on an 
American residential street, engendering enmity between neighbors in 
order to weaken their awareness of a coming invasion.
Zombies take up many of these traits, but they make some significant 
departures fit for a post-Cold War, post-globalized, post-Christian and 
(as some people say) post-modern world. The first evident difference is 
that zombies don’t trouble to conceal their invasion. It wouldn’t occur 
to them. And unlike most diabolical, imperial alien overlords, zombies 
don’t have a reason for invading in the first place.
3  The episode The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street is available on YouTube at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7OGCe08eXo

3. The Four Symbols of the  
Zombie Metaphor
Following Christopher Moreman, we note that while there has been much 
academic discussion of zombie movies, there has been little examination 
of the zombie itself, prompting us to “analyze the zombie as a symbol in 
itself” (Moreman 2010: 264). Motivation is not all that the zombie lacks. 
As a symbol of the loss of meaning, the zombie embodies a plethora of 
vacancies, empty placeholders for the building blocks of meaning.
3.1 The First Symbol: The Semiosis of the Zombie
1. Zombies don’t talk.
They aren’t mute or reticent. They simply have no language. 
They have nothing to say. They don’t transmit gists of conversation. 
Crucially, they do the opposite: they transmit their own vacuity. They 
communicate their incommunicability. The zombie’s most marked 
pathology is that it lacks intelligibility.
2. Zombies are communal.
With a twist: they possess the momentum and self-organization 
of culture, without the narrative imagination that gathers common 
purpose. Hence, zombies are like culture gone awry. They are communal 
creatures in that they vaguely share proximity, but there is no accord 
among them (see also Webb and Byrnand 2008). They cannot read in or 
reach out to one another. They do not coordinate to achieve concurrence. 
© 2017 J. Vervaeke, C. Mastropietro, F. Miscevic, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0113.03
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They are in company, but not together. They are surrounded, but each 
alone. They lack culture.
3. Zombies are homeless.
Zombies do not have lairs, nests, coffins, castles or caves. They do 
not retreat anywhere as sun breaks the horizon, as the moon breaks 
the clouds or as the spring breaks the winter. Zombies drift. They are 
equally suited, and unsuited, to the ground they occupy. They do not 
have province in any one space (see also Webb and Byrnand 2008). They 
do not have propriety for any one person. There is nothing whatsoever 
about a zombie that appears to belong to the world. A zombie simply 
“shuffles”, bungles absently from one place to the next. If zombies were 
human, they might be feeling a little uprooted. But perhaps we can 
understand a portion of their plight. Not belonging anywhere, being 
from anywhere… this is precisely part of the encroaching foreignness 
we described in section 2. Zombies lack home.
4. Zombies eat brains.
The appetite of a zombie is a very particular kind of appetite. No 
matter how much a zombie devours, it will continue feeding for as long 
as it is able. Its gormandizing is indiscriminate and voracious, and its 
famishment apparently bottomless. But it is insubstantial. The zombie 
represents raw consumption. It does not seem to imbibe the things it 
consumes; it simply extinguishes them. A zombie never stops eating, 
but never grows or changes. In its insatiability, the zombie has put its 
face to the disorder of addiction. It craves with absolute singularity, and 
its craving becomes its nature. It wants to have, but never to be (see also 
Fromm 1976). It is constantly filling, but never gets full. The zombie’s 
lack has become a hunger (see also Webb and Byrnand 2008). In fact, in 
one pivotal scene1 in Day of the Dead,
the pointlessness of the zombie appetite [is made apparent] as one 
captured zombie continues to try to eat despite the fact that its internal 
organs have been removed and so the ‘‘food’’ simply drops to the floor 
upon being swallowed. (Moreman 2010: 275)
1  Scene available at https://gomovies.to/film/day-of-the-dead-1985-17728/watching.
html?ep=549712 at 22:57.
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Zombies are a brain-oriented monster, in operation, appetite and 
vulnerability. Interestingly, in many accounts of the zombie, the only 
way to kill a zombie is by destroying its brain―if you will: obliterating 
mind to obliterate mindlessness. We can find a strange twist tucked into 
this pattern: that the mindlessness evinced by the zombie is begotten 
by its brain. Zombies are a perversion of mind precisely because they 
notably lack the properties of mind we think fundamentally human, yet 
they visibly want to acquire mind in the most literal sense of acquisition. 
Only by destroying their brains do you destroy the threat to your 
brains posed by their mindlessness. What is being intimated here is a 
very unsettling dependency between the threat of mindlessness and 
the possessing of mind. The brain is a symbol for intelligibility. The 
devouring of the brain indicates the devouring of that intelligibility and 
all it affords. The fact that brain is driving the consumption of brain 
is a deeply complex symbolic occurrence; culture is devouring culture, 
mind is devouring mind, humanness is devouring humanness. This 
evinces a deep presence of mindlessness within mind. Implicitly, it tells 
us that zombies are not an external threat, but an internal one. They are 
a symbolic villain that assumes most characteristics of humanity, and 
subverts them with decay. As one character in The Walking Dead points 
out to his fellow survivors:2 “We are the walking dead” (see also Goto-
Jones 2015; Moreman 2010; Webb and Byrnand 2008).
5. Zombies are ugly.
This is the operative difference between the zombie and most other 
popular horrors. Vampires are flushed with sex appeal, Frankenstein’s 
monster is endearing, and in its exotic way, even the werewolf is a 
beauteous animal. But zombies are ugly by definition: dead, rotting, 
stinking, without vitals, lacking the spirit that makes one human being 
attractive to another. A zombie is not guilty of concealment or duplicity. 
The ugly mug does not sheath any hidden depths. The essence of a 
zombie shares the visage of its appearance. Ugliness is the zombie’s 
nature. We cannot see the mind of a zombie because they have no 
mind to see. The vacancy in a zombie’s gaze provides a window to the 
absence of soul.
2  Season 5, episode 10 is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AyYuvILOgck
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The enduring disconcertment is the fact that zombies look like us. 
They do not just happen to look like us; therein froths the real potency 
of the metaphor. Zombies are something inhuman in human form―not 
just ugly, but ugly in the image of person. Dehumanization makes the 
zombie more destitute than the ugliest orc, that they are a debasement 
of cosmetic sensibilities. And the zombie upends all cosmos in human 
nature. Physical ugliness is its deformity of dignity. Mindlessness is 
deformity of the intelligible. The human guise of a zombie aborts human 
feeling. It reviles contact. It brings us to a dead end.
6. Zombies are not evil.
Unlike the conspiring alien, the deceptive vampire, or the malevolent 
spirit, the zombie lacks the defining characteristic of monstrous villainy: 
it lacks evil. Because of its mindlessness, the zombie does not possess 
malevolence; even as it drags itself forward in consumption, it is merely 
scrabbling to satisfy a base instinct of its own craving. But it does not do 
so with the awareness of malintent. The destructiveness of the zombie’s 
impact is no more known to it than a bacterial infection is known to 
the culpable bacteria. The zombie, dangerous, hideous and destructive 
though it is, intuitively defies the category of evil. Despite the twisted 
resemblance to its living counterpart, the zombie is no more evil than a 
rabid animal.
7. Zombies are heedless.
Zombies are fierce and threatening, but not self-preserving. They 
give no thought to defending themselves against harm. In this sense, 
they lack the defining feature of a living organism. They bear no 
fundamental relationship to their survival. In pursuit of consumption 
they will destroy themselves (see also Webb and Byrnand 2008).
8. Zombies are untouchable.
Their ugliness is catchable, and they have a 100% rate of contagion. 
If you come into contact with a zombie, infection follows inevitably. We 
don’t want to be ugly, mindless, homeless or incommunicable, so when 
confronted with a zombie, we take care to keep our distance. But the 
deprivation of closeness is severely consequential. If we are to suppose 
that the monster really has been created in our image, then it poses 
several complications to our yen for touch.
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Our penchant for touch is, ultimately, what distinguishes intimate 
relationships from non-intimate ones, not only relationships with 
people, but with animals, objects, and concepts. The more “in touch” we 
are with something, the closer and more connected we are to that thing. 
Touch is the medium of intimacy. Without it, it is hard to imagine that 
intimacy could exist at all. However, intimacy is not the only casualty of 
the zombie’s untouchableness.
Our being in the world is heavily dependent upon touch to keep 
a continuity of contact with our surroundings. Experience is deemed 
“true” when it impresses us through contact. We come to believe 
something as a result of having touched it, literally or otherwise. We 
come to be affected by it once it has “touched us” in turn. And of course, 
we don’t consider our relationships to be loving relationships until we 
feel comfortable with touching one another.
Touch is the arbiter of “real”. Assertions of verity are always made 
with permutations of a touch metaphor. Those with whom we are 
intimate are more real to us. Objects we have handled are more real to 
us. Emotions we have felt are more real to us. Losing touch costs us our 
grasp on reality.
3.1.1 Intensifying Meaninglessness: Zombies as a Threat 
to the Three Marks of Realness
Realness is a multivalent term. Conversationally, it is often used in 
reference to qualities of lucidity that are not captured by its ontological 
definition, which refers strictly to truth and falsehood. When an 
individual says that something feels “real” she is seldom referring 
to whether something is verifiable. Instead, she refers to a sense of 
connection, a way in which her felt experience relates to patterns or 
events in the world. This relating is often described with reference 
to propositions of truth and falseness, but this is only a reference in 
metaphor. A “sense of realness” is a psychological experience, not a 
metaphysical principle.
Our sense of touch is an apt analogue for this psychological 
experience, and the symbol of the zombie has appropriated it. The 
contact implied by touch represents a quality of relation that is integral 
to feelings of connection; meaning. Metaphorically, touch is a versatile 
18 Zombies in Western Culture
enough source domain to represent both cerebral and physical forms of 
relating. The zombie co-opts this versatility. The felt sense of realness 
is not a single impression, but a series of marks that relate to (i) the 
intelligible, (ii) the interactional, the (iii) interior and (iv) the insight-
affording connections that orient our actions in the world. The nature 
of the zombie undermines each of these marks. It poses a paradox 
that undercuts intelligibility, it has an inter-categorical nature that 
confuses our interaction, it vacuums our interior presence of mind, and 
it bankrupts us of a promised capacity to use insight to transcend the 
boundaries of outmoded perspectives. We will discuss the first three 
marks in this section, and the fourth in section 3.4.1.
3.1.1.1 The Zombie is Paradoxical; It Defies Intelligibility
Intelligibility as an explicitly discussed concept began in many ways 
with Plato’s dialogues. It refers to the rational confirmation of reality 
and its contents, the form in which the world is represented reflectively 
in human cognition. To the degree that our minds grasp the form of 
something, can identify it notionally based on distinguishable properties, 
we would say that the thing is intelligible; readable by our minds.
The zombie defies rational confirmation because it lacks the coherence 
of properties that allow us to form rational definitions. The nature of the 
zombie is beset by paradox; it is human and non-human, living and not 
living, cultural and non-cultural, natural and supernatural, suspended 
between fundamental binaries that most definitions presuppose.
Living ––––––––––––––– [zombie] ––––––––––––––– Non-living
The zombie not only eludes a definition of its own, it also disrupts 
the definitional integrity maintained by the binaries it is suspended 
between: if the zombie is both alive and not alive, what now does it 
mean to be “alive”? And if it is both human and non-human, what then 
does it mean to be “human”?
Human ––––––––––––––– [zombie] ––––––––––––––– Non-human
Intelligibility allows us to see the world with conceptual clarity. The 
definition of the zombie is unintelligible, which means that any likeness 
associated with the zombie is distorted by that association, like an 
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image that has come too near the fracture line of a broken mirror. The 
contradictions of the zombie provoke a disconfirmation, a kind of black 
hole within its intelligibility that vacuums any elements that have been 
tethered to its likeness, including and especially its humanity. The 
zombie’s influence disrupts the binary relationship of the human and 
non-human. This raises the question “what is the difference between 
the human and the zombie?” Our sense of realness in our humanity can 
quickly be destabilized by the zombie’s presence.
The zombie paradox is not just problematic from the safety of its 
fiction. The zombie is very nearly human, enough to be a moniker 
for certain human states and behaviors. Consider, for example, how 
frequently we use “zombie” to describe stupors of illness, fatigue or 
mental dysfunction, and consider the similarities to the destitution of 
the monster. Like the alien, the zombie walks a line between natural 
and supernatural, and our incredulousness toward it seems tentative 
enough for the monster to be hypothesized as a genuine biological 
terror. Therefore, the paradox of the zombie not only rests upon the 
question “is it human?” but also upon the question “does it exist at all?”
This paradox is the prime potency of the zeitgeist, the axle upon 
which all other symbols of the zombie rotate. The likeness and unlikeness 
to humanness are both uncanny. The zombie is not only a paradox by 
definition (or lack thereof), but also in its epistemological intrusiveness: 
the monster cannot be disconfirmed. We cannot be sure that such a thing 
exists, or does not exist. Moreover, if it does exist, we cannot be sure it 
is not simply ourselves, a distorted reflection in the pond on the other 
side of the non-human spectrum. The paradox of the zombie defies the 
intelligible. It defies a consistent, conceptual sense of realness.
3.1.1.2 The Zombie is Inter-categorical; It Defies Interaction
The zombie’s paradoxical place on the spectrum between human and 
non-human, existent and non-existent, and natural and supernatural, 
undermines a second mark of realness. The zombie is an inter-categorical 
monster―it is perpetually in-between categories, neither one thing nor 
its opposite. Intelligibility is required for rational confirmation, but for 
something to seem real, representation is not sufficient. Simply put: we 
need to know what things are so that we know how to encounter them. 
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We need to be able to place them before us. There is a sensual dimension 
to realness. Understanding is not enough; we need to be able to interact 
with the world.
The kind of contact provided by interaction is not an intellectual 
kind, but the kind that relates to action. The sense of realness is an 
embodied sense, not simply a cerebral one. The world must not only 
make sense, it must have sense. It must not only be represented, it must 
also be reciprocated. It must be touchable, and it must touch us in turn.
This is where the inter-categorical nature of the zombie interferes 
with our sense of realness: it encumbers our ability to interact. We noted 
in the previous section that contagion is among the zombie’s more salient 
features, and within the monster’s narrative, survivors who encounter 
a zombie must avoid touching it at all costs. The more multitudinous 
the zombies become, the more this danger is compounded. In a world 
inhabited by the zombie, the physicality of touch becomes an undying 
hazard. Ordinary humans are constantly at risk of exposure, and are 
therefore zombies in waiting. This is a world that discourages contact in 
all of its forms and bucks the rituals of interaction. For this reason, the 
zombie represents a crisis of intimacy. We treat everyone like a stranger 
in this world because it is the only way to avoid infection. In this world, 
we are surrounded and yet stranded, inundated while utterly alone. 
This simultaneity of the zombie’s presence and absence is an inter-
categorical problem laid over the paradox of its unintelligible definition. 
Not only is the zombie―and by extension, its human foils―unclear and 
disconfirming, it is also profoundly alienating.
3.1.1.3 The Zombie is Vacant; It Lacks Interiority
Of the many paradigmatic influences that have trained our sense of 
realness, Cartesian has been perhaps the most pivotal. Much of the 
Western philosophical tradition continues to lean on the metaphysical 
and epistemological framework laid by Descartes treatises. The cogito 
ergo sum of Descartes’ Meditations is one of those maxims in Western 
philosophy distinguished by its rare notoriety; its philosophical 
import on the question of “what is real?” is still the prime reference for 
enlightenment philosophy, not just within the annals of academic work, 
but for the broader culture and its epistemic presuppositions.
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The Cartesian tradition sets out the third of our fundamental marks 
of realness: clear and distinct intellectual perception. At the center of 
this mark is the phenomenon of metacognition, the mind’s ability to 
recognize and reflect back on itself. This self-recognition of consciousness 
is the individual’s awareness of himself, his existence, and his capacity 
to think and, therefore, to be. To Descartes, this fundamental criterion 
was a kind of charter with reality, an ontological base camp from which 
to brave the wilds of a potentially duplicitous world. The interior of the 
camp was the individual’s certainty of his own realness.
The zombie defies this mark of realness perhaps more obviously 
than any other, and in so doing it builds upon its paradox from the 
previous marks. A lack of human consciousness is definitive of the 
zombie, particularly because it is otherwise so strikingly human in 
appearance. It is because of this trait more than any other that the 
zombie becomes the source domain for human debasement―the literal 
lack of consciousness is a symbol for states of mental absence, fugue and 
fatigue that have become idiomatically synonymous with zombification. 
The most common reason we refer to someone as a zombie is that he 
doesn’t seem fully conscious. He is not aware of himself. He does not 
notice the world go by.
The zombie lacks an inner life, an interior presence of mind that 
is commensurate with thought, intention and direction. The zombie’s 
inner vacancy is symbolized by a blank stare and shifting movement, 
driven by unreflective, sub-human cravings. The lack of interiority 
means that the zombie cannot connect to the world, it cannot affirm 
its own realness by the Cartesian criterion, and it cannot affirm the 
realness of its environment. Turned on the individual, this lack is wholly 
destructive. Her connection with the world is severed at the stem, and 
she cannot even be sure of herself, let alone a world beyond her. An 
existence without interiority is a disconfirmed existence. It lacks even 
the most basic constituents on which to build the foundation for a sense 
of realness.
It is important to understand that the zombie symbolically undermines 
each of these marks of realness. The zombie is a participatory symbol. 
By this we mean it invokes and invites action. It does not simply refer 
to but also instantiates the object of its reference, whether the object 
is paradox, destitution, homelessness or alienation. A participatory 
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symbol is more active than a regular symbol; a valentine heart and a kiss 
are both common symbols for love, yet the shape of a valentine heart 
plays no causal role in love itself, whereas a kiss instigates intimacy. 
Similarly, the zombie is a participatory symbol because it enacts the 
phenomenon to which it refers. It does not only stand in for these 
degenerations, it also demonstrates them. In our own enactments, we in 
turn demonstrate the zombie.
Activities like the urban zombie walks speak to all that is participatory 
about the zombie symbol. The simulations in which humans deliberately 
undermine their own humanity add salience to the zombie’s defiance of 
realness. While such playacting may be dismissed as frivolous, it is also 
possible that these acts are trying to draw attention to a resemblance. 
When we take our attention away from the mindless walkers long 
enough to look around at their human counterparts, we are perhaps 
meant to genuinely wonder the difference.
3.2 The Second Symbol: The Name of the Zombie
This brings us to our next observation of zombies in popular fiction, 
though in fact it is more of an observation about our survivors. You 
may have noticed that zombies are almost never “zombies”. No one 
in film (save the more comedic renderings) ever refers to a zombie as a 
zombie. They refer to “walkers”, “the dead”, “the undead”, “corpses”, 
“flesh-eaters” or “the infected”. But they never use the most common 
cultural term. In fact, they seem wholly unfamiliar with the concept of 
a zombie until the apocalypse befalls them. They are ignorant to the 
tropes associated with the genre of their distress. It is often remarked 
strange and amusing that no one in a zombie movie―set in the same 
time and world we live in―seems ever to have seen a zombie movie.
There have been few exceptions to the absence of the term 
“zombie”, but each of these exceptions demonstrates the instability 
of how the term is used. Once again, even in name the zombies 
communicate their incommunicability. The first exception is World 
War Z. Uncharacteristically, zombies are here referred to by name, 
but the characters are quite reluctant to use the term. When they find 
themselves speaking the name of “zombie” the heroes are ill at ease. 
Why this reluctance? Traditionally in horror movies, characters are 
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reticent to utter the name of the monster because of the sheer disbelief 
in supernatural agents. However, coming to believe in the vampire 
or the werewolf is often the first step in empowering the resistance to 
the monsters (as soon as the hero knows she is facing a vampire, she 
knows to arm herself with a crucifix and wooden stake). In contrast, 
the zombie is not supernatural, nor hard to detect. In World War Z (as 
in most films of the genre) the protagonists are surround by hundreds 
if not thousands of zombies, so there is no cause for disbelief. Nor 
does naming the monster provide any empowerment. Absent these 
traditional reasons, an alternative explanation for the reluctance is 
needed. Using the term of “zombie” opens a gap in the intelligibility 
of the world, a vacancy that cannot thereafter be filled. In a traditional 
horror movie the monster disrupts the order of the characters’ world, 
but in acknowledging the monster’s existence, the characters are able to 
reorder the world to accommodate the supernatural disruption. The evil 
of the monster becomes a normative guidance; it inspires the effective 
righteousness of the protagonists. This accommodation is not a passive 
acquiescence, but an active and effective resistance. The characters can 
now fight back. However, acknowledging the zombie―who is not 
evil―brings no accommodation, and yields no empowerment. To use 
the term is to despair.
Another exception is the film Only Lovers Left Alive. It was directed by 
Jim Jarmusch and released in 2013 to critical acclaim.3 The film features 
two centuries’ old vampires, Adam and Eve, languishing uneventfully 
through eternity. When the term “zombie” makes its appearance, it 
is used not by a human hero, but by one of literature’s oldest horror 
monsters. The vampires use it disdainfully, not in reference to the usual 
undead creatures, but to ordinary humans. These fanged beings, whose 
lives appear as meaningless as they are enduring, find the lives of their 
human contemporaries even more meaningless. Their contempt for our 
zombie behavior is casual and matter-of-fact. The malaise of human life 
is, at least to the vampires, an obvious and unquestioned fact. The name 
of “zombie” is used explicitly and without reluctance only in this case: 
when it is made to describe human life. We are the walking dead.
3  A trailer is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ycOKvWrwYFo
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When we examine this closely, we begin to realize that the 
zombie zeitgeist is not a single symbol, but a dynamic constellation 
of interlocking symbols. The creature of the zombie is the icon of the 
zeitgeist, and as we have explained, the name of the zombie also carries 
a symbolic conveyance that embellishes the phenomenon. We might say 
that these are the first two symbols in the constellation. The next two 
symbols are more diffuse in their representation. The third symbol is 
the relation between the viewer and the zombie genre as she encounters 
it. The fourth symbol is the apocalypse, which is often paired with 
the zombie, and has given rise the conjoined catchphrase, “zombie 
apocalypse”. Independently and in concert, these symbols speak for the 
meaning crisis.
3.3 The Third Symbol: The Failure of the 
Metanarrative
As she follows a story, the viewer integrates two different perspectives 
in order to gain both involvement and reflection. The viewer has the 
perspective of the characters in the story, but also a “godlike” perspective 
beyond that possessed by any character. The relationship between these 
two perspectives can be called the metanarrative of the story. The interplay 
between these perspectives affords the viewer a kind of participatory 
insight. This insight in turn inspires a transformation in the viewer. The 
metanarrative binds the viewer to the meaning of the story. However, in 
the zombie story there is no transformation. In the zombie story, the two 
perspectives clash. In the zombie story, the metanarrative fails to bind.
The first stage of any outbreak story is the survivor’s struggle to 
overcome her disorientation and create a profile of her adversary. The 
viewer’s distress of a zombie film is to watch the inevitable unfold―
the story begins by focusing on a single character through a window 
of momentary normalcy. The rising action begins with a very sudden 
appearance of the outbreak, which the character narrowly manages to 
escape. After a period of isolation, the character meets other escapees 
who share information, and the survivors converge on a working 
perspective of the crisis and their predator. They find some advantageous 
haven with renewable means of sustenance, and they attempt to fortify 
it. They delegate roles and try to live as a community.
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But it’s never to be, because the survivors quarrel. They dissent over 
trivialities and their tenuous order fails. Conflict divides them into 
factions, and selfishness breeds mistrust. Usually by some oversight, 
the wayward survivors alert the zombies to their whereabouts and 
once again become overrun. Their tentative home disintegrates. They 
struggle to escape and go on the run, and zombies follow in pursuit. 
The film reaches its climax as the survivors become desperate and 
overwhelmed. Most of them fall. The film ends either with the death or 
infection of the remaining survivors, or with a suggestion of the peril’s 
ceaselessness: that there will only ever be more of the same: fighting… 
evading… trying to outrun the inevitable (see also Moreman 2010; Webb 
and Byrnand 2008).
The final revelation of the film extinguishes the last feelings of 
hope. The survivor feels―as the viewer knows―that there is no land 
left untouched. There is no one immune from infection. There is no 
garden to flee to, no island of retreat. There is nowhere left to hide, and 
there is nothing more to tell. Much like the zombie, the story drifts off 
as we realize the outbreak is unending. The credits roll ambiguously 
thereafter.
Stories of the zombie always begin close in and zoom out gradually. 
We follow a single character as she intakes more and more of her 
situation’s horror. As the camera and story pan, the situation darkens. 
Chances of survival become less and less likely, and the prospect of 
salvation becomes bleaker. The story ends as it began, with calamity. 
But it does not grant us a final understanding. The story ends, but it 
refuses to conclude.
We watch all of this happen as knowing spectators. We know the 
walkers are zombies and we know better than to confuse them with 
humans. We know they eat insatiably and we know they grow in 
number. We understand the threat before our fictional counterparts 
experience it, and we look for the firearm long before the survivors 
acquire it. We anticipate shelter before the survivors find it. We know 
it will be fruitless as the survivors brace it. We know the survivors will 
not sustain community. We know the zombies will win by attrition. We 
know these things as we would of any other fictional horror, but there is a 
discrepancy in that the survivors know none of it. There is a vast distance 
between us and the survivors because they are incapable of sharing our 
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references. This is another clue that the human survivors are not quite 
equal in elevation to the culture that authors them. We know more than 
they do. We see as they do not. Like watching Oedipus Rex, we have the 
expectation of incoming tragedy. We have the feeling of dramatic irony. 
We can predict the failure of the survivors before they fail.
And yet… it’s not really like Oedipus. It’s not a tragedy. Because while 
we can predict the survivors’ failure, we are no better at understanding 
it than they are. We certainly cannot predict anything beyond it. And we 
cannot quite call it ironic either. The absence of a conclusion breaks the 
pattern that defines dramatic irony, namely comparing the character’s 
apprehensions against the coming of a contrary result. But the zombie 
has no final result. It has no finality at all. Only drift. Tragedy is marked 
by a metanarrative, an overseen conclusion that makes sense of the 
events leading up to it. Metanarratives provide a frame for the story, 
but the zombie outbreak cannot be framed. We don’t know where it 
has come from, and we don’t know where it is going save that it will 
continue to consume, continue to engulf, delete, and die. Zombies 
bring not just death, they bring interminable death. The waves of a 
zombie apocalypse are always falling, without purpose, and without 
end. Tragedy is an afterword ascribed to events of dramatic suffering, 
a denouement that dignifies the events of suffering by giving them 
significance. The zombie apocalypse is the anti-tragedy. It immerses us 
in a story and denies us closure. It invests us into the face of character 
and has us look on as the face deforms. It has us watch as the eyes of our 
protagonists glaze and go blank. It has us hope for the redemption of 
the human survivors, and ever so slowly, it takes that hope away. The 
zombie is an aesthetic for the deepest despair because it chokes on a 
meaningful story. It pushes us into the position of a metanarrative, and 
then withholds the metanarrative from us.
Even though we identify the tropes, our savvy is otherwise unhelpful 
because nothing of our irony would assist a survivor in the long run. We 
can predict the failure of the narrative and the absence of conclusion, 
but we have nothing to offer in its place. And that, more than anything, 
is a cause for despair. We cannot transpose ourselves into the crisis and 
be sure of a more meaningful experience. Even at a safe distance, our 
anxiety and uncertainty disable us because against all reason, we cannot 
help but to dread the absurdity of their predicament, and to wonder how 
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distant it really is. We cannot integrate the perspective of the characters 
with the perspective of the viewer. There is no participatory insight or 
transformation. There is no meaningful connection.
3.4 The Fourth Symbol: The Zombie Apocalypse
Fig. 4: Ludwig Ferdinand Schnorr von Carolsfeld’s depiction of the 
Apocalypse with Jesus (ca. 1831).4
Today, the term “apocalypse” is applied extemporaneously.5 It usually 
refers to the end of the world, of human civilization, or a range of 
calamities and disasters. This is a telling inaccuracy. The definition of 
apocalypse as a synonym for destruction only captures one axis of its 
biblical origins. The Christian apocalypse was never simply the end of 
the world: it was the resurrection of the body, and the revelation of final 
truths. Just as the zombie’s mug distorts the cosmos of human likeness, 
the zombie zeitgeist distorts the cosmos of apocalyptic revelation, by 
offering resurrection without rebirth (see also Moreman 2010). 
3.4.1 Intensifying Meaninglessness II: The Zombie is 
Bankrupt; It Lacks Insight 
The Christian apocalypse is the breaking of an old worldview to 
afford the emergence of a new worldview. As such, it represents 
the mutual transformation of mind and world. In the everyday, 
4  Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Schnorr_von_Carolsfeld,_
Ludwig_Ferdinand_-_Apocalypse.jpg
5  For further reading on the topic of apocalypse see also Lisboa (2011).
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this transformative process refers to the shifting of perspectives to 
accommodate an unforeseen exposure, the sudden, spontaneous 
emergence of comprehensions that deepen our understanding of 
reality. These so-called light bulb moments are instances of “insight”, 
and the phenomenology of this experience gives us the fourth and 
final mark of realness.
This mark of realness is best described as a sense of wonder. When 
the world cedes us something from beyond the frame of our existing 
perspectives, our sense of ontological surprise is deeply significant. 
While it is crucial for us to have a grasp on the world, it is also crucial 
for the world to escape that grasp so that our mapping of reality can 
be recast and recaptured. The feeling that there is more to reality than 
what we know of it strengthens its integrity, and its independence 
from our subjectivity makes it more trustworthy. While it is necessary, 
as discussed above, to feel that the world is consistently intelligible, 
it is also necessary to have our sense of the world pulled periodically 
from underneath us. Insight emerges from the wreckage of this 
experience. It allows our perspective to reframe itself around a fuller 
appreciation of reality, like stepping out from behind a camera, or 
losing your footing only to regain it with more traction. 
The traditional apocalypse is the religious macrocosm of this 
perspectival shifting, but the zombie apocalypse bankrupts it. The 
world of the zombie decays but there is no revelation to redeem the 
fall. When the frame around reality is shattered, it is left asunder 
and never reformed. The realness marked by insight is foreclosed by 
the utter limpness of the zombie’s world, where there is no longer 
sustained vitality or the ethos of industry. There is some property 
to this world that lacks the dynamism for creation and reinvention. 
Nature overgrows but nothing cultural grows from it. There is no 
cosmic insight that pulls back the veil on the working of reality. The 
zombie apocalypse breaks the world without enhancing the view, 
and resurrects the body without bringing the abundant life that Jesus 
promised.
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3.4.2 The History of the Zombie Apocalypse
Fig. 5: Depiction of the Martian invasion of H. G. Wells’ 1898 classic, The 
War of the Worlds. Illustration by Alvim Corréa, from the 1906 French 
edition of the novel.6 
The zombie is not fiction’s first instance of a secular apocalypse. It 
has evolved from a modern zeitgeist that has toyed with the aesthetic 
of apocalypse while gradually abandoning its Christian matrix. 
Ostwalt (1995, 2000) argues that the secular apocalypse is one that 
can be averted by human ingenuity and science. The genesis of this 
tradition was perhaps H. G. Wells’ War of the Worlds, published in 
6  Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:War_of_the_Worlds_shoot.jpeg
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1898. Notably though, Wells’ novel is not completely secular; in the 
afterword of its epilogue, the plague that kills the Martians is declared 
to be the providence of God. The first true secular apocalypse instead 
emerges halfway through the twentieth century from deep within 
the wariness of the Cold War. Unlike in War of the Worlds, the threat 
of nuclear annihilation is completely manmade, and in the absence 
of an interloping villain, this apocalypse withholds the opportunity 
for any classic form of human heroism. Perhaps no film depicts this 
new variety of bleakness more potently than Stanley Kramer’s 1959 
film On the Beach.7 This atomic-age story about the end of the world 
is one of film’s first tragedies without deliverance. Crucially though, 
while the world depicted on screen perishes into the atomic cloud, 
the film retains a noble consciousness. The characters accept their fate 
with affirmation and dignity in their humanity. More importantly, 
the film arcs to a higher order purpose that transcends the frame of 
its narrative―it implores us, the viewers, to heed the warning of its 
tragedy and intervene against the corresponding threats in the real 
world. In its depiction of humanity, and the drive of its metanarrative 
(in contrast to the zombie films), the story of this apocalypse retains 
a vital kind of intentionality. This is where the zombie narrative 
differs. The zombie apocalypse exhausts the remains of hopefulness, 
however frail, found in these preceding stories. It is the culmination of 
unhallowed endings; gone is the providence and heroism of Wells, and 
gone is the dignified finality of nuclear twilight. As Moreman (2010: 
271), following Charles Mitchell, argues, “[t]he zombie apocalypse 
is one that allows for the success of no human ingenuity”. We have 
already discussed the viewers’ impotence in the face of the zombie 
apocalypse―there is no metanarrative imperative inspired by these 
stories and no swell of human fellowship to offer emotional resonance. 
The ending is not punctuated by informed irony or moralism. It is 
simply the end.
7  Available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ue8hC5qqMt4&list=
PL_7mZVLEeOA1cJDEDL-WIZppvxBNiuSKE
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Fig. 6: The concomitant rise in usage of the words “zombie” and 
“apocalypse” from 1930-2008 in predominantly English books 
published in any country.8 
As Fig. 6 suggests, the zombie and the apocalypse are independent 
symbols that have magnetically found each other over the course of 
the last half-century. The modern zombie apocalypse is the co-emerged 
pairing of a certain kind of creature to a certain kind of world. The 
world depicted within the zombie apocalypse is an analogue to the 
zombie itself, causative of the creature, and created by it. This complex 
dynamic has been conditioned by a generation of successive films that 
have resewn the genre into the tropes we now recognize. Three of the 
earliest zombie films mark this transition significantly:
• Night of the Living Dead―1968: George Romero’s classic is the 
birth of the modern zombie proper: mindless, undead corpses 
that move laboriously and devour human flesh. Though 
radioactive contamination is implied, the cause of their 
animation is unclear and ultimately peripheral. Apocalypse 
threatens, but does not ensue.9
8  From Google N-Gram Viewer, smoothing factor of 3 (Michel et al. 2011).
9  Trailer available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ob8vZhSjES8 
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• The Omega Man―1971: Based on Richard Matheson’s 1954 
novel, I am Legend, this Boris Sagal film further integrates 
the appearance of the zombie and the event of apocalypse. 
After biological warfare extinguishes most of the planet’s 
population, a plague turns a small group of survivors into a 
ghoulish horde of darkness-dwelling sub-humans. Here the 
zombie-apocalypse causality becomes more pronounced. Yet 
the zombification is not complete. The zombies are murderous 
but not mindless, anti-cultural but not yet acultural. Though 
it follows Romero’s perversion of Christian resurrection, the 
film does not altogether abandon its sanctity, and ends by 
grasping at the symbol of a Christian sacrifice.10
• Dawn of the Dead―1978: Romero’s sophomore effort gives us 
the first fully-fledged zombie apocalypse. By now, the nuclear 
overtones have faded away, and there is no exterior witness 
to intervene. The cause of the zombie outbreak is unknown 
and the fate of the human survivors, far from hopeful, is also 
unknown.11 
As though magnetized to one another, zombies and the apocalypse have 
been drawn into an unholy marriage despite their unrelated origins. 
Their affinity is now so deeply cast that storytellers are hard pressed to 
invoke one without attracting the other, like flies to rotting food. Even 
two more recent post-apocalyptic films, whose conceit had nothing to 
do with the undead, featured startling, accidental depictions of human 
zombification: The Road (2009), based on Cormac McCarthy’s Pulitzer 
Prize winning novel, and Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) both take place in 
a post-apocalyptic future, and although neither of these films include 
the resurrection of corpses, both give us a glimpse of a non-literal, 
human zombification―in The Road, the degenerating of the species 
into barbarous, subcultural cannibals, and in Mad Max, into scurrying, 
insect-like creatures that gather to idols of a primitive religion. The 
semiotic adjoining of zombies and the apocalypse is beginning to seem 
automatic, and emergent. The two elements couple to create a backdrop 
10  Trailer available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUkU18MrBzU 
11  Trailer available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd-z5wBeFTU
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genre so iconic and palpable, that to plot your narrative in the not-so-
distant future of the zombie apocalypse is now akin to―and the precise 
inverse of―beginning your story with the line “a long time ago in a 
galaxy far, far away”. 
The term has become a common object of cultural reference that is as 
casually recognized as The Beatles, Star Wars or Harry Potter. The clime 
of fiction of course has a permeable membrane, and the zeitgeist has 
already moved beyond it. The zombie apocalypse is now the mise-en-
scène for the popular theatre of survivalism and disaster preparation. 
Outdoor survival camps and fitness programs frequently use zombie 
apocalypse as their chosen terrain. Governments have even used the 
zeitgeist as a tableau to drum up interest in evacuation policy and 
disaster management procedures. Yet, the theatre of a zombie apocalypse 
is not so much about donning the attire of a fantasy as it is removing the 
attire of civility. Despite the elaborate makeup, the theatrics of zombie 
walking are more about stripping down the world than they are about 
dressing it up. There are no interesting accessories or architecture that 
helps to raise the pretend world from fantasy because the world of the 
zombie apocalypse is less, not more, adorned. The zeitgeist is altogether 
ugly, and that makes even the more tasteful zombie enactments an 
effacing kind of art form.
3.4.3 The Ecology of Worldview
The relationship between the zombie and the apocalypse is the obverse 
relation of a dynamical system that exists between an individual and 
the world she inhabits. This dynamical system is what the cultural 
theologian Brian Walsh (2006), following anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
calls a worldview. A worldview is two things simultaneously: (1) a 
model of the world and (2) a model for acting in that world. It turns the 
individual into an agent who acts, and it turns the world into an arena 
in which those actions make sense. A worldview typically structures 
the environment to provide affordances for an agent; situations in the 
world are foregrounded with implicit guidance as to how an agent 
should address and interact with them. Meanwhile, the worldview 
typically structures the individual into an agent; it foregrounds and 
configures the behavior of the individual into coherent action that 
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resonates with the affordances of the world. Fit together, the agent 
and arena mutually make sense of one another, and ratify each other’s 
existence and intelligibility. The configuring effect of a worldview is 
present even in the simplest of actions: a man cuts some flowers and 
carries them to his dwelling. He gives the flowers to the woman who 
dwells there with him. Under the acuity lens of their worldview, an 
otherwise rudimentary act becomes the prism for a transfiguration that 
deepens the nature of their relation to one another. With the giving of 
the flowers, many significations take place: the man is transformed 
into the lover, she into the beloved, their dwelling into a home, and the 
flowers into a celebration. 
The worldview is the cultural analogue of an ecology. The attunement 
between the agent and the arena mirrors the Darwinian fittedness 
between an organism and its ecological niche. A fluid worldview is akin 
to a healthy and balanced ecology. Just as there is the possibility for an 
ecological crisis, there is also a possibility for a worldview crisis. The 
zombie apocalypse represents such a crisis. 
4. A Worldview in Crisis:  
The Domicide of Apocalypse
4.1 Grassy Narrows
Worldview, its creation and its loss, are immeasurably complex 
phenomena to chart and chronicle. Comprehending the scope and 
implications of a worldview crisis requires us to deviate from our 
discussion of the zombie and return to the work of Brian Walsh in the 
following section. Walsh’s work scaffolds a discussion of worldview 
loss on a term called “domicide”, a signifier for the destruction of home 
first introduced by J. Douglas Porteous and Sandra E. Smith (2001). In 
our discussions of worldview, we continue to extend the definition of 
home into a metaphor for the canopy of worldview, the cultural and 
cosmic domiciles that coordinate our beliefs and behavior, like the “faith 
in America” we discussed in section 2. Two case studies―one local and 
modern, the other sweeping and historic―will help to carry this term 
up the scale of magnitudes, arguing that “domicide” is the term best 
suited to a unified symptomatology of our meaning crisis. 
Walsh discusses the Anishinaabe of the Grassy Narrows First Nation 
who live on a reserve in northwestern Ontario, 80 kilometres from 
Kenora near the Manitoba border. They were relocated there in 1963 
by authorities in the Canadian Federal Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development. Motivation for the relocation was well-
reasoned; access to a variety of provisions―including schools, roads, 
electricity, health care institutions and employment opportunities―
would be considerably improved. Most significantly, the housing that 
© 2017 J. Vervaeke, C. Mastropietro, F. Miscevic, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0113.04
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the Nation was provided with was brand new and infrastructurally 
upgraded. They had more power and more protection against the 
elements. In a very short period of time, Grassy Narrows was spared 
from the modest conditions of their old reserve and inaugurated into 
the life of contemporary suburban domesticity.
What followed was an effect that very few individuals―and 
apparently no one within the Federal Department―managed to foresee. 
By 1970, the Grassy Narrows Nation was “the site of some of the most 
severe social and familial disintegration, together with environmental 
despoliation, ever to be seen in North America” (Walsh 2006). Cases of 
domestic conflict, violence and suicide exploded in number, employment 
plummeted, welfare dependency increased and as many 1000 people 
showed symptoms of being infected with Minamata disease, caused 
by mercury-dumping upstream. “By the mid-80’s, the Grassy Narrows 
community demonstrated the numbness of spirit and utter hopelessness 
that rivaled any Third World situation” (Walsh 2006).1
A great deal of public fallout came with the exposure of these 
conditions. Criticisms in both popular media and academic 
publications―Walsh’s included―took the disaster of Grassy Narrows 
as an opportunity to charge the Federal Department with “cultural 
genocide”, an accusation that interrogated the issue through post-
colonial critique. Walsh noticed, however, that the deepest and most 
compelling aspect of the crisis was the cultural upset that occurred 
within the walls of the community. The transition into new housing 
did not have the reasonable effect that the officials in question were 
hoping for; even if we assume the Federal Department acted on benign 
1  We follow Walsh in acknowledging that the appearance of Minamata disease from the 
mercury poisoning in the English-Wabagoon River contributed severely to the Grassy 
Narrows’ devastation from the sixties to present day. However, Walsh also notes that 
the Anishinaabe attribute the beginnings of this crisis to their forced relocation, which 
by their accounts preceded the appearance of Minamata symptoms. It seems likely 
that the loss of home exacerbated the ecological devastation caused by the toxicity, 
undermining the social and cultural resourcefulness that would have equipped the 
community to respond. “As one member of the community put it, ‘Now we have 
nothing. Not the old, not the new. Our families are all broken up. We are caught in 
the middle […] between two worlds, two ways of life’” (Walsh 2006). If the dynamics 
of worldview sustain the coherence of family and community, the collapse of these 
dynamics likely precipitated the loss of those support systems; a community cannot 
turn to its world for help if it is lost between one world and another. 
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intentions, it was arguably their relocation of the reserve that exacerbated 
the disintegration of the Grassy Narrows Nation. 
Why did this happen? Answering this question requires us to 
identify with a very severe kind of deprivation that occurred in the 
Nation’s relocation. Walsh’s discussion of this deprivation begins 
by describing a complex relationship between two interconnected 
sociocultural practices that, in 1963, were suddenly at loggerheads. This 
is the relationship between housing and homemaking. Understanding the 
depth of distinction in this relationship is crucial to unpacking the fate 
of Grassy Narrows. What precisely do we mean by home? 
First, consider the role of homemaking conterminous to house 
making. The house maker tends to the physical construction of a space 
and materializes the optimal arrangement for its organization―
an arrangement that precedes and afterward consummates the 
construction. The house is built in agreement with a design that affords 
this arrangement. The homemaker is ultimately responsible for it. He is 
the one who organizes the space long before the house maker is enlisted 
to raise it, and makes it meaningful long after the house maker has gone 
home. The relationship is effectively described by a quote that Walsh 
(2006) cites early in his article: “We shape our buildings”, Winston 
Churchill wrote. “Then our buildings shape us”. 
Now consider the testimony of a 71 year-old Grassy Narrows elder, 
after his community began to disintegrate:
We don’t live like the white man, that’s not our way. The white man 
lives close together, but we don’t. We like to live far apart, in families. On 
the old reserve, you knew your place. Everybody respected your place. 
[…] It wasn’t private property, but it was a sense of place, your place, 
your force around you. […] As soon as they started to bunch us up, the 
problems started, the drinking, the violence. This has a lot to do with 
being bunched up. (Walsh 2006)
On the old reserve, the Anishinaabe lived in a series of circular compounds 
that were separated by clan. These compounds had been placed at a great 
distance from one another, and had equal access to the river. This distance 
respected the territoriality of hunting and trapping, but also helped to 
mark a configuration in the plot of the reserve that reflected the social 
structure and hierarchical organization of the community. Not only did 
the spaciousness of the reserve support and enable the hunter-gathering 
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customs, but it also served as an implicit reminder of one’s position in the 
reserve relative to his neighbors, and what that relationship permitted 
in terms of the cultural praxis. A clan’s presence within the reserve was 
determined by the placement of their compound, in which the status 
of their membership within the culture was encoded. The particular 
emplotment of a family’s home had significance; it gave both identity 
and security and told each clan where it was meant to be. It observed 
the sense of place described by the elder. That sense did not only connect 
one clan to another, but connected the reserve as a whole with the living 
land it inhabited. The Anishinaabe belief in “force” invokes the fluency 
of worldview attunement that we have discussed; there is the force of 
foregrounding and the configuration of place out of physical space. The 
elder refers to an energy that inhabits all space in accordance with a Great 
Spirit; even the space we assume dead or empty is filled with a spiritual 
quality that gives the space its vitality. Affording the place for this 
force was therefore a matter of necessity, tantamount to the importance 
of accessing water, game and arable soil. It was also believed that, not 
unlike natural provisions, certain places were more inherently charged 
with this force than others. Naturally then, the degree to which empty 
space could be cultivated within the confines of the reserve determined 
the suitableness of the reserve for habitation, and the empowerment 
of its residents to maintain both physical and spiritual health. It is also 
important to note that the circular structures of the compounds were 
deliberate patterns created in likeness of the “medicine wheel and the 
drum, and representing the four directions […] integral to a sense of well-
being, wholeness and being at home” (Walsh 2006). The circle of the home 
continuously impressed these directions into the cognitive landscape of 
significance, tracking relevant movements, delineating whereabouts and 
fixing the individual’s position relative to the dimensions of the world 
around him. The old reserve of the Anishinaabe provided more than 
shelter. It provided a worldview,
a vision of life that provides its adherents with a foundational 
understanding of how the world works. That means, however, that 
a worldview necessarily also functions as a vision for life that gives 
direction for normative and life-giving ways to live. A worldview shapes 
those who live in its embrace so that they develop certain habits […] 
ways of living and relating to each other in the world. (Walsh 2006)
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The Anishinaabe’s home was not significant simply by its place in the 
outside plot, but just as deeply by the interior shape of the dwelling. It is 
the signifying of space that makes a place of it. Place emerges not simply 
in us, or simply in space, but in the mutual modeling that prepares one 
for contact with the other. Place is the way of encountering, occupying 
and appropriating space, the finding of relevance within space, and the 
presence of ourselves as part of the space. We have evidence for this 
anywhere we build. We build spaces that anticipate our involvement 
in them, and become externalized paradigms of relevance. “Buildings 
behave, demonstrate certain legibility” (Walsh 2006). 
The residents of Grassy Narrows weren’t homeowners anymore 
because the moment the housing project was completed, they had 
ceased to be homemakers. They weren’t recognizing themselves within 
their homes, and they weren’t connecting to anyone through their homes. 
At home, you are more than simply an occupant; home remembers you, 
home understands you, home is where you are recognized, home is 
where you belong. But recall the comments made by the elder of Grassy 
Narrows: the space no longer communicated to its occupants. It wasn’t 
conveying any more. It was not telling. It was not remembering, and it 
was not understanding. The arrangement failed because the space was 
no longer phrased in any perceivable order. It could no longer answer 
implicit questions of who, what, where or why. The loss of intelligibility 
to the organization induced a crisis of placement. The residents no 
longer understood the affordances of their environment. They were no 
longer able to use their homes as a way to constitute themselves. They 
could no longer use them to be part of the world. 
“Strip a people of that sense of place, deprive them of the space that 
they feel is necessary to establish such a sense of place, and they are 
rendered homeless” (Walsh 2006). Following Walsh’s definition, the loss 
of home may be called domicide. 
Humans are animals who most fundamentally understand what reality 
is, who we are, and how we ought to live by locating ourselves within 
larger narratives and metanarratives that we hear and tell, and that 
constitute for us what is real and significant. When such narratives 
collapse, we are lost in the dislocation, fragmentation and disorientation 
of homelessness. […] In short, one suffers from a worldview crisis. One 
runs the risk of “losing the plot”. (Walsh 2006)
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The zombie apocalypse is a representation of the ultimate domicide. 
The zombie is homeless and the exhaustion of the apocalypse renders 
the world unhomeable. Instead of fitting together, the agent and the 
arena are irreparably out of joint. Consequently, the world of the zombie 
apocalypse is a diseased world in perpetual decay. As Wood (2003: 105) 
argues, “the social order […] can’t be restored”.
4.2 Domicide of the Hellenistic Era
Fig. 7: Bronze bust of a man, ca. Hellenistic Era.  
Photo by Giovanni Dall’Orto.2 
2  Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1415_-_Archaeological_Mu 
seum,_Athens_-_Bronze_portrait_-_Photo_by_Giovanni_Dall%27Orto,_Nov_11_ 
2009.jpg
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Across epochs in history, and from individual communities like that of 
Grassy Narrows to entire civilizations, social order and culture appear to 
be universally vulnerable to the threat of domicide. Just as an ecosystem 
can be irreparably disrupted at any time, whether constituted by the 
dust mites in your pillowcase or the creatures of the Cretaceous, so too 
can the virtual ecology of worldview attunement unravel. That a culture 
is living means that, inevitably, it will die. 
For instance, the Hellenistic period from the fourth-first century BCE 
was marked by unprecedented conflict and strife, procuring widespread 
social and political unrest. Alexander the Great had conquered most of 
the known world, and just as he was to begin his rule, he unexpectedly 
fell ill and died in Babylon, bestowing a tenor of senseless tragedy on an 
era that would incur further tragedy still. His great kingdom split into 
four states which subsequently went to war for the next several centuries. 
This period of upheaval left people massively displaced both physically 
and psychically. It became commonplace to be surrounded by others 
who did not share the same language, nor heritage, nor values. Athens 
had once been the seat of democracy, with every man encouraged to 
participate in its political and economic affairs; now, one would have 
been thousands of kilometers away from an unmovable, monolithic 
monarchy. As with the Anishinaabe, the collapse of a common social 
and cultural base estranged people from one another. By losing their 
political and economic agency, a chasm formed between people and 
state. By virtue of losing their connection with and being unable to act 
intelligibly in their world, people became estranged to themselves.
The suffocating domicide of the Hellenistic Era is reflected in the 
emergence of the symbol of the philosopher as physician. As Epicurus 
famously remarked,
Empty is that philosopher’s argument by which no human suffering 
is therapeutically treated. For just as there is no use in a medical art 
that does not cast out the sicknesses of bodies, so too there is no use in 
philosophy, unless it casts out the suffering of the soul. (Nussbaum 1994)
Hellenic philosophy centrally came to emphasize self-healing, in stark 
contrast to our zombie, afflicted by a disease with no cure.
There is something telling in the comparative semiosis of our 
present-day zombie and the Hellenic philosopher-physician. In the 
Hellenistic domicide, individual and collective agency was usurped 
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by the widespread intrusion of foreigners and foreign rule. With the 
Anishinaabe however, after the initial blow of relocation, the foreignness 
that encroached came from within. Their worldview attunement worked 
against itself, alienating individuals from themselves, from others, and 
their cultural metanarratives. It was precisely because of the way their 
culture was structured that it fell apart under those circumstances, 
rather than offering salvation and deliverance from those circumstances. 
Culture amplified, rather than ameliorated, tragedy. It gnawed on itself 
from within.3
Recall from section 3.1 that the zombie eats brains―that brain is eating 
brain, the instrument of intelligibility. The instrument poses a threat to 
itself (see also Vervaeke and Ferraro 2013, vis-à-vis parasitic processing). 
The zombie embodies this hidden vulnerability twofold―it is not only 
parasitic on our intelligibility, but in its heedlessness it is also parasitic 
unto itself. It is one thing for culture to run its course and give rise to 
the next stage in its development, or even to be conquered by another 
culture―a death and rebirth, if you will. It is another for it to trip over 
itself and expedite its own demise―a waking death the walking dead 
epitomize. As Hume (1889) wrote, “the corruption of the best things 
gives rise to the worst”. Our domicide is more like the Anishinaabes’ in 
this sense, but as penetrating and pervasive as the Hellenes’. Therein lies 
the rub of the pairing of zombie and apocalypse. Nature will overgrow 
and smooth the jagged edges of cataclysm. Even the vampire or alien 
will seek to re-establish their systems and way of life. The zombie is 
the creature most unfit to reverse the status of apocalypse. The agency-
arena breakdown is so complete, so thorough, that our very apparatuses 
for restoring order are themselves rendered irreparable. It is these two 
factors that concomitantly elevate the domicide we are experiencing to a 
full-blown meaning crisis. Unlike the Hellenes who found comfort from 
their cultural domicide in the symbol of the sage―the philosopher-
physician who could alleviate suffering―our symbol of the zombie 
apocalypse offers only the grim prognosis that, like a cancer, our culture 
is doomed to destroy itself from within.
3  The point not being a critique of Anishinaabe culture, but a demonstration that 
under certain circumstances, any culture can eat itself from within.
5. The Four Horsemen of the  
Zombie Apocalypse:  
Converging Evidence for a Crisis in 
Meaning
Fig. 8: Albrecht Dürer’s woodcut of The Four Horsemen  
of the Apocalypse. (ca. 1498).1
1  The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, CC0 1.0. http://www.metmuseum.
org/toah/works-of-art/19.73.209/
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Evidentiary arguments for the meaning crisis cannot be reduced to 
empirical research, though such research remains integral. It would be 
impossible to shed light on an indeterminate condition without venturing 
into territories where no present research exists. The evidence of crisis 
is sprawled across a spectrum of phenomena. To survey such a vast 
coastline, a degree of disciplinary eclecticism is required. This does not 
mean that our theory of the crisis is eclectic, but that to properly triage 
the condition, our account of signs and symptoms must vary according to 
the kinds of expertise required to investigate them. This suggests that an 
integrative, holistic approach is essential. Such is the only justification for 
an essay on human meaning via an exegesis on zombie lore.
However, we now have a plausible hermeneutic of the semiosis of 
the zombie as a symbol of the meaning crisis. It is now time to consider 
the empirical evidence for the existence of the crisis. While it may be 
possible to give a partial account for each of the individual phenomena 
we investigate without invoking the zombie, no such explanation can 
dispel the mystery of how, and why, these seemingly disparate crises are 
developing simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner. There 
is, as Charles Taylor (1991: 3) notes in The Malaise of Modernity, “a certain 
convergence on themes of decline. They are often variations around a few 
central melodies”. Although our base is holistic, we shall demonstrate a 
convergence of evidence for a crisis in meaning. Respecting the zombie 
apocalypse as the flag-bearing symbol for the meaning crisis, we propose 
to rhetorically organize the evidence for the crisis into categories analogous 
to the iconic symbol of the Christian apocalypse, viz., the four horsemen. 
“Through distinctly Christian symbolism, the zombie can be seen to 
represent a subversive rejection of an enforced Catholicism” (Moreman 
2010: 264-65). The four horsemen of the Christian Apocalypse―Famine, 
Pestilence, War and Death―carry the themes of decay and self-subversion 
suited to scaffold our zombie apocalypse. 
If the zombie draws out our withdrawal, stands for our lack of standing 
for anything, and is in touch with how out of touch our worldview has 
become, then the zombie is the embodiment of domicide. Its lack of 
reflection is revealed in a disturbing trend of radical disengagement 
cutting across all domains of human life, deeply severing ties to 
ourselves, others, and an overarching social metanarrative. We stand 
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to lose our cognizance, communicability, community and culture. We 
stand to become the walking dead. This is our zombie apocalypse.
We hunger for meaning in the normative void of a collapsing 
worldview, starving of an empty mind, facing Famine in a culture of 
excess. Loneliness spreads, quite literally, like a disease (Cacioppo, 
Fowler, and Christakis 2009), poisoning and thinning our relationships 
like Pestilence. At the same time, we are deeply disillusioned by 
cornerstone cultural institutions such as politics, marriage, religion 
and media―casualties of a War with (and within) the state. Death, the 
spectre of domicide, disengagement from our worldview, is at once the 
means and end, the alpha and omega of the meaning crisis that animates 
the horror of the zombie apocalypse.
5.1 Death
In chapter 3, we discussed the gradual formation of the zombie symbol 
through a sequence of films leading up to the present day. These films 
moulded the features of the zombie, developing the apocalypse more 
and more explicitly. However, perhaps the most significant property 
of the zombie apocalypse is the relationship it has with religion. If 
our culture’s worldview was successfully maintained by the meta-
meaningfulness of the Christian faith, the zombie apocalypse represents 
the death of this worldview, and the death of faith itself. Michael Walzer 
makes the following observations in reference to Romero’s films, which, 
as discussed above, are the prototypical exemplars for the phenomenon: 
[Zombie] films at face value appeal to a faithless world-view. […] Many 
critics have recognized the racial, feminist, anti-capitalist, anti-war, and 
generally anti-authoritarian stances in Romero’s films. Few, if any, have paid 
much heed to the religious implications, however. When religion appears in 
these films, it is generally shown to be ineffective. (Moreman 2010: 272)
Religion is the most universal instance of worldview attunement to 
preside in the history of our species.2 It is, like our individual homes, “a 
dense moral culture within which [people] feel some sense of belonging” 
(Walzer 1987).
2  We are not being religiously apologetic or hearkening for a return to Christian 
symbolism; we have no adherence to its content, merely pointing out its historical 
functionality.
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Worldviews―that is, these life-constructing and directing meanings―
are not “ideas” that are held but “worlds” that are inhabited. Indeed, 
Peter Berger, would say that sharing a worldview provides a community 
with a “sacred canopy”, a mythic cover of protection for life, under 
which the day-to-day business of making homes, shaping community 
and sustaining life together can happen. (Walsh 2006)
Consider the role of religion prior to the scientific revolution. In the West, 
the Roman Catholic Church was not separated from the dealings of other 
societal systems; its creeds and councils governed all of the systems 
that facilitated significant practices in society―political, economic, 
judicial, marital, recreational, etc. Everything was understood under 
the governance of the church, and it was by virtue of this overarching 
governance that everything came together. That is why Geertz defined 
religion as a meta-meaning system, a form of worldview attunement 
that integrates cultural relevance in all of its forms, and places all other 
meaning systems into an order of coherence and stability. Then came 
the separation: “church and state”. A reflection of diminishment in the 
integrative power of the system. Broadly speaking, we in the West do 
not gather as a society around our churches any more. We do not rally 
to them for restitution. When fortuitous events occur, we do not tribute 
them. When terrifying events occur, we do not round on them.
In the West, we are realizing with divisive discomfort that our 
Judeo-Christian model of meaning, which occupied our teleological 
awareness for over a millennium, was unprepared for the post-scientific 
world into which it was ushered. In our contemporary division of the 
sciences, burgeoning naturalistic accounts supported by a dawning 
comprehension of the brain, much of our scriptural teleology no longer 
satisfies us to our core, and our previously personified, cooperative 
universe can no longer be trusted to hold us in its favour. At no one 
moment in particular, we as a civilization lost the anchorage by which 
we could govern and organize a sense of the Absolute.3 It is an ill-
kept secret that the institutions of older worlds are increasingly held 
in contempt, left to witness the dissenting of their congregations. In 
general, attendances in churches worldwide are failing despite the 
3  In the philosophical tradition, the Absolute is a concept of ultimate reality, truth or 
essence whose existence is eternal and unconditional.
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strained attempts of religious bellwethers to reaffirm their relevance 
(Norris and Inglehart 2015).
Research for the trend is piling up. According to a study by the Pew 
Research Center, nearly a quarter of the US public4 and “a third of adults 
under 30―are ‘religiously unaffiliated’―the highest percentages ever in 
Pew Research Center polling”5 history, overtaking Catholics, mainline 
Protestants, and all followers of non-Christian faiths. This percentage has 
risen steeply just in the last few years, and the demographic data is telling: 
many of the unaffiliated in the study are identified as young adults who, 
unlike prior generations, are characterizing their lack of attendance in 
religious services as a form of disengagement reflective of their disregard. 
In other words, fewer people are inclined to say “I am Catholic” if they 
don’t regularly attend a Catholic service. Instead of simply identifying 
with religion on a de facto basis (as with citizenship or ethnicity) more 
people are actively refusing the identification in cases where it is obviously 
inapplicable. This unclassifiable group has come to be called the religious 
“nones”. In roughly half of the world’s countries, they are the second-
largest religious group.6 According to the Pew Research Center, they 
mark the symptoms of an increasingly widespread disaffiliation from 
institutional religious participation. However, the religiously unaffiliated 
have not necessarily rejected a spiritual life. In fact, many cite the desire 
for a genuine spiritual life as related to their disinclination to organized 
religion. In other words, the refusal to invest in specific organized religions 
does not indicate irreligiousness. 58% of the “nones” report feeling a deep 
connection with the earth or nature. This finding is no different than the 
percentage for the general US population. Many research participants 
expressed the following sentiments: that though religion in general does 
in fact benefit society, the religions themselves are just too isolating and 
unsatisfying in content and in practice. In 2016, only 55% of millennials 
credited religious organizations with “having a positive impact on the 
way things were going in the country”, compared with 73% six years 
earlier, demonstrating the increasing irrelevance and, in fact, disdain for 
4  http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ 
5  http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ 
6  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/22/what-is-each-countrys-second 
-largest-religious-group/ 
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religious institutions.7 Though fewer and fewer people identify openly 
with a particular organized religion, it seems that the want of a meaningful 
spirituality has never been more pregnant. What is clear, however, is that 
the spiritual vacuum is not moving people towards organized religion; it 
is (at least in part) causing their dissent.
In the culture of criticism, “nones” of analysis have now emerged 
in response to the vacuum. Many of them assemble loosely under the 
title of postmodernism, taking an approach to theory that subverts 
conventional formulations of structure, and subjects human activity to 
illimitable interpretability. Postmodernism reacts to the precariousness 
of social identity, the dilemmas of relativism, the problems of agency 
and the denaturalizing of mind, message, power, language and the 
anthropocentric world. It wonders how the individual hopes to navigate 
an unnavigable sea of possible meanings and whether there can ever be 
an essentiality to the living of life, a definitive indication of who and 
where we are and what we ought to be. It wonders because the answers 
aren’t clear anymore, because modernity feels the absence of a singular 
governing system for our beliefs. It is as though we are struck suddenly 
with the realization that no one is watching us. There is no skyhook of 
appraisal for our performance. There is no superintendent to approve or 
disapprove of our actions. We have awoken to the task of being our own 
minders, responding to our own directives, drawing our own maps and 
writing our own rules. We are adolescents reeling from the prospect 
of our independence, disarranged from the sudden loss of a parental 
source. And now, it sometimes seems that anything goes. The world no 
longer offers itself as an attendant. All responsibility we put upon the 
once fated world now rests entirely upon our shoulders.
Evidence that our cultural institutions are failing us can be found 
in the worldwide rise of the religiously unaffiliated―these so-called 
“nones”. Yet their disillusionment does not inoculate the “nones” from 
the corresponding losses of religion. They still crave a sense of home, 
a presence in community, and a system of shared beliefs. The lapse 
of the “nones” from religious participation, though different in many 
respects from the domicide of the Anishinaabe, poses a similar, if more 
gradual, declension in worldview attunement. Since this attunement is 
7  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/04/millennials-views-of-news-
media -religious-organizations-grow-more-negative/ 
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fundamental to the agent-arena relation discussed above, the loss has 
a calcifying effect on its ecology, and on all meaningful participation 
that was inculcated by the coverage of a sacred canopy. As Walsh and 
others have observed, this canopy does not simply project doctrinal 
and creedal beliefs, but every element of religious activity that has 
psychological importance; the social, communal and ritual dynamics 
of participating in the world beyond oneself. These dynamics are like 
a respiratory system for the ecology of attunement, providing fluidity 
to the economy of the agent-arena relation and its mutual affordances 
for action. In the absence of this fluidity, the ecology of the religious 
worldview is not sustainable. The respiratory system, without the 
accord of its component chambers, cannot function properly. 
For the “unaffiliated” portion of our population, respiration of 
worldview attunement is no longer performed by organized religious 
influence. If the worldview of Christianity is eclipsed by secularization, 
then there is no viable way to recapture its potency as a meta-meaning 
system. This means that we need to find alternative systems of meaning 
that provide similar combinations of symbolic provocation, ritual and 
social fluency. As it turns out, such systems are not easily recreated. 
You cannot breathe deeply, after all, without an adequate respiratory 
apparatus. Out from under the canopy, our culture is left gasping in a 
miasma; finding our bearings in the world, establishing our capacity 
for action, understanding what is expected of us―these are all 
Sisyphean tasks while the different arenas of life remain farraginous 
and uncoordinated to the eyes of the agents who navigate them. 
Evidence of our gasping has surfaced widely across contemporary 
popular culture. Ersatz mythologies have emerged as a kind of 
similitude for the collapsed lung of religious institutions, presenting 
would-be symbols of vitality obverse to the decay represented by the 
zombie. “A panoply of new religions formed in the wake of the [sacred] 
canopy’s rending” (Moreman 2010: 273). Like the zombie itself, these 
mythologies have their origins in narrative fiction, with properties that 
have, in some cases, generated mass following and elevated them to 
the status of zeitgeist. Though they differ by source, certain elements of 
these fictions are concentric with the structures of the Christian mythos, 
and draw their significance―consciously or not―from the echo of 
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Christian archetypes.8 In this way, we call these mythologies pseudo-
religions; they mimic the structure of religious narratives and embody 
those narratives through a form of ceremonial role-play that recalls the 
rituals of liturgical sacraments. However, though the mythologies have 
participatory elements, none have espoused the complexity of belief that 
integrates their narrative into a fully-fledged, dynamical worldview.9 
Even while participating in these mythologies, the identification of the 
participants is limited, and their disbelief, while suspended, remains 
intact. Where a person mistakes a pseudo-mythology for a genuine 
religious worldview and identifies with its narrative beyond a plausible 
limit, his belief is regarded as infantile or delusional. At best, he is 
thought to be unsociable. At worst, he is considered cultish.
Fig. 9: San Diego Comic Con (2012). Photo by Kevin Dooley.10
8  The authors are astonished that many seem offended by the suggestion that these 
Ersatz mythologies are anything but secular and identify this as a ‘masked man’ 
fallacy. It would be largely uncontroversial for a cultural anthropologist to describe 
these activities as religious. We conjecture that these activities reflect a desire for 
religion, but the offense at naming them as such reflects a pervasive sense of the 
obsolescence, impotence and even damage attributed to organized religion. That 
these powerful Christian narratives and archetypes are exapted again and again 
through these Ersatz mythologies, however, validates some of their power and 
existential import.
9  Our replacement functionalities have been insufficient. They are derivative of 
systems—particularly Christianity—that have already been eclipsed. They do not 
offer something new. More than being merely derivative, however, they satisfice 
without satisfying, preventing the necessary transformations for addressing our 
meaning crisis. See also section 5.4.1 below, “Reality Disengaged: On Bullshit”.
10  CC BY 2.0, Flickr. https://flic.kr/p/cxQS1s
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Fig. 10: The emergence of two of the most prominent modern pseudo-
religious symbols, exemplified in the usage of the words “zombie” and 
“superhero” from 1930-2008 in predominantly English books published 
in any country.11
Modern superhero myths are among the most pervasive of the 
neoteric pseudo-religions. Originating in comic series in the early 
1900s, their popularity has burgeoned gradually over the last half-
century and―like the zombie―spiked precipitously in the last two 
decades, evidenced in Fig. 10. To date, there have been over 200 
superhero films made by major studios in the United States, grossing 
over 15 billion dollars12 worldwide and supplemented with copious 
merchandising. As the frequency of these films has increased, an 
interesting phenomenon has begun to occur; the studios responsible 
for these creative properties are making more deliberate attempts 
to establish metanarrative across the spectrum of their works. They 
have rolled out shared universes for their characters, with longer arcs 
and more integrated storylines. These are all efforts to situate the 
various films in a way that makes them gesture across time, makes 
them more relevant to one another, and by extension, makes them 
more intrinsically relevant to themselves. These sweeping endeavors, 
11  From Google N-Gram Viewer, smoothing factor of 3 (Michel et al. 2011).
12  http://www.the-numbers.com/movies/creative-type/Super-Hero 
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piloted by giants like Marvel and Lucasfilm, are regenerating their 
popular mythos into continuous, cultural phenomena, featuring 
cosplay, conventions, and a cast of heroes that are as significant 
to many people’s lives as their own professional identities and 
occupations. 
The superhero myths have great staying power because they 
are practicable. Though the identification is―in the most literal 
terms―only in pretend, the playfulness and sense of community are 
manifest. Most significantly, these mythos feature figures that, like 
the prototypical Superman and the monkish Jedi, have unmistakable 
resemblances to Christ, Buddha and other divinities. The pseudo-
religious mythologies have impressionistically co-opted this 
resemblance for maximum cultural impact. Even when the likeness is 
uncanny, the appeal of these mythologies is unshaken.
The internet and social media have provided new playgrounds 
through which to shape our involvement in these pseudo-religions, 
allowing people to come together under various memberships and 
affiliations. This is religion without existential import―its wisdom 
is only as good as the universe it comes from. The reasons for this 
are complex, and beyond the scope of this book. Sufficed to say, it 
is uncontroversial to presume that one may live as a Christian or a 
Muslim, but not as an Avenger, Jedi or Brony.13 Despite secular 
arguments that invoke fairy tales to argue that religious narratives 
are quixotic fantasies, most sense implicitly that these comparisons 
are wanting. The Marvel Cinematic Universe does not have equal 
import to a religious meta-meaning system, and one cannot simply 
substitute one for the other. It seems plausible however, that the rise 
of the former, coinciding with the decline of the latter, may be trying 
to make up some portion of the difference. 
The pale horseman of Death rides at the axis of the meaning crisis, 
and the other horsemen on his flank―Famine, Pestilence and War―
are variations on a sweeping cultural dissolution at the scales of 
individual phenomenology, distributed over social experience, and 
manifest writ large in the treatment of political life and institutions. 
In all cases, the phenomena, to the scales of each of these levels of 
13  We discuss this further in section 5.2.3 below, “Suicide, Marital Status and Religious 
Affiliation”.
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resolution, are characterized by the same radical disengagement, 
the unravelling of the systems that were oriented by religious meta-
meaning that is now setting below the horizon. It is important to 
reiterate that while each of these individual scales―we might think 
of them as sections of an orchestra―play a dirgeful rendition of 
“melodies of decline”, Death provides the central rhythm. The 
Western decline of religion, concomitant with imitating mythologies 
and the growing demographic of “nones”, are co-emergent with the 
zombie symbol of apocalypse. The many properties that constitute 
the Deathliness of the zombie―its mindlessness, homelessness, 
speechlessness, ugliness and heedlessness―are merely analogues 
for symptoms of domicide that have emerged along the dimensions 
of our personal, social and civic existence. Our horsemen are 
mythograms for these symptoms.
5.2 Famine
There is perhaps no greater evidence for radical disengagement from 
the world than the rising crimson tide of suicide worldwide. In the 
US, suicide rates have increased in all age groups since 1999 except 
those 75+, with suicide rates tripling in the 35-64 demographic as of 
2010 (Sullivan et al. 2013; Curtin, Warner, and Hedegaard 2016a). Now, 
suicide accounts for more deaths each year in the US than by motor 
vehicle accidents, and is the second leading cause of death of those 
aged 10-34.14
And this isn’t exclusively a North American phenomenon. According 
to the World Health Organization, suicide rates have increased 60% 
worldwide over the past 45 years. Worse still, the Center for Disease 
Control estimates that for every suicide, there are 25 suicide attempts. 
Assuming this ratio has held constant over the past 45 years, a 60% 
increase in suicide would suggest a 1500% increase in suicide attempts 
worldwide. The number one cause of suicide is reportedly untreated 
14  Note that the increase in suicide is not simply accounted for by an increase in 
population or in longevity. Suicide rates reported here, unless otherwise noted, 
are corrected to population size (reported as per 100,000). Life expectancy in the 
US in 2010 was 78.7, up from 76.7 in 1999, not likely to dramatically skew the age 
distribution of suicide.
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depression,15 suggesting that its sufferers experience a hopelessness 
so thorough that the only perceived solution is to remove oneself 
from one’s situation in the most literal sense possible. There is a deep 
dissatisfaction with everyday existence and a disquieting horror of its 
perceived inescapability.16 Only the vacuum solution of death beckons. 
One is starved of alternatives. Suicide is hunger for a way out. 
But a way out of what, precisely? Though we in the West tend 
to view suicide as a highly individual phenomenon, some of the 
earliest research on suicide, such as the extensive study on the 
subject conducted by Émile Durkheim (1897), cogently illustrates the 
deeply social nature of suicide and its intimate ties with a person’s 
sense of place in a social, religious and cultural order. According to 
Durkheim, the horror of losing one’s place in the social and cultural 
apparatus drives the individual symptoms of anxiety and depression 
that lead to suicide.
Our need for a socially and culturally meaningful life, according 
to Durkheim’s social integration theory of suicide, resonates with the 
experiences chronicled in Victor Frankl’s international bestseller, Man’s 
Search for Meaning (1946). Frankl makes a case study for the protective 
effect of meaning in one’s life, drawing from his many observations 
of the suffering endured in the concentration camps of the Second 
World War. The book’s original German title was …Nevertheless Saying 
“Yes” to Life, which is telling, as Frankl’s exposition of an extreme loss 
of home, culture and community is precisely the kind of condition 
that can provoke suicide. Frankl’s prescription for enduring involves 
deriving meaning from the hope that these may be restored, and that 
the seed of restoration already exists within the agent. His method of 
logotherapy gives a prescription for self-affirmation when one is “[i]
n a position of utter desolation, when man cannot express himself in 
positive action, when his only achievement may consist in enduring 
his sufferings in the right way—an honorable way […]” (Frankl 1946), 
hearkening back to the Stoic’s response of the philosopher-physician 
15  http://www.suicide.org/suicide-causes.html, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Suici 
de/Pages/Causes.aspx, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/happiness-in- 
world/201004/the-six-reasons-people-attempt-suicide 
16  This is evidenced, in part, by the observation that global, stable attribution styles 
contribute to suicide ideation (Kleiman, Miller, and Riskind 2012).
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to the Hellenistic domicide. This alternative, viable way of making 
sense of the world allows one to remain at home in one’s self, in spite of 
external circumstances. The corollary is that suicide must not only be 
consequent of an agent’s hunger for meaning; it is also the result of an 
inability to locate any in the arena of the world. The impoverishment 
of worldview engenders famine. Frankl himself remarks that the 
success of his book is not an accomplishment on his part “but rather 
an expression of the misery of our time: if hundreds of thousands of 
people reach out for a book whose very title promises to deal with the 
question of a meaning to life, it must be a question that burns under 
their fingernails” (Frankl 1992: xiii).
5.2.1 Suicide, Economic Status and Economic Volatility
One’s ability to participate in a social and cultural exchange of 
meaning depends on a basic degree of economic agency. As such, 
when the economic standing of individuals or societies is threatened, 
suicide rates increase in turn. For instance, the market crash of 2008 
saw a marked increase in suicides worldwide, mostly in European and 
American men aged 15 and older (Chang et al. 2013). In the US, the rate 
of increase in suicides nearly quadrupled, from 0.12 per 100,000 per 
year in 1999 to 2007, to 0.51 suicides per 100,000 each year from 2008 
to 2010 (Reeves et al. 2012). Unemployment accounted for a quarter of 
the variance in suicide during the most recent economic crash (Reeves 
et al. 2012), and is so potent a pressure that even the anticipation of a rise 
in unemployment rate can lead to an increase in suicide (Stankunas et 
al. 2013).
The relationship between economic agency and suicide, however, 
is more nuanced. Durkheim’s insight was recognizing that economic 
standing is only one of many interacting factors mediating an 
individual’s social integration. For instance, the effect of poverty on 
suicide is not as pronounced as might be expected if economics alone 
are considered. When there is a lower class of which to speak, social 
integration within that class is possible, and hence the proclivity for 
suicide decreases. It is, in fact, individuals who face either the extremes 
of poverty or the extremes of wealth that exhibit an increased propensity 
for suicide. Additionally, racial gaps in wealth do not correspond to 
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racial gaps in suicide. In the US, for instance, the median net worth of 
whites in 2014 was at least ten times that of either blacks or Hispanics.17 
And yet, the rate of suicide among whites is almost four times greater 
than that of blacks, and three times greater than Hispanics (Curtin, 
Warner, and Hedegaard 2016b). The question, clearly, is less about 
economic standing per se and more about economic agency, insofar as 
the end of such agency is social integration.
In the US, suicide rates have been increasing prior to the most 
recent economic crash and have continued to rise since, despite an 
economic recovery above 2008 levels (Curtin, Warner, and Hedegaard 
2016a). Given the strong effect of unemployment on suicide, it is 
plausible to suggest that a perception in the faltering of individual 
agency in the economic arena is at least in part responsible for this 
suicide trend (Chang et al. 2013; Curtin, Warner, and Hedegaard 
2016a; Hempstead and Phillips 2015; Stankunas et al. 2013; Reeves et 
al. 2012). Furthermore, the fact that an economic recovery has done 
nothing to ameliorate the suicide rate suggests that though economic 
standing may largely be restored, there may nonetheless be a looming 
sense that economic agency has not.
People have, in part, lost confidence in the institutions that 
are supposed to nurture both individual and collective economic 
prosperity. According to a recent Gallup poll in the US, faith in 
economic institutions is the lowest since polling began in 1973―a 
striking 12 percentile points lower.18 The OECD concurs that this 
disturbing trend is reflected in countries across the globe.19 The 
market crash of 2008, now being hailed as the “Great Recession”, is a 
guttural example of how the machinations of large-scale institutions 
can threaten individual financial agency. And yet, we have little 
choice but to open ourselves up to vulnerability. Our dependence on 
these institutions is stamped into the shape of modern life, such that 
renouncing them is to renounce modern life altogether.
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5.2.2 Suicide and Political Stability
Political volatility often interacts with economic instability 
synergistically, corresponding with a greater combined threat to social 
integration. For instance, during the reinstation of independence in the 
Baltic states in the early nineties, amidst massive unemployment and 
political instability, the suicide rate skyrocketed, reaching (and, in the 
case of Latvia, exceeding) 40 deaths per 100,000―more than triple the 
EU average (Stankunas et al. 2013). Political volatility in this region so 
dramatically saturated the pressures towards social disintegration that 
unemployment rate, which peaked in 2000 and 2001, had no perceptible 
effect on suicide rate (Stankunas et al. 2013). The Baltic states also 
suffered the worst economic losses of the EU countries in 2008, yet saw 
only a modest increase in the number of suicides, and still only half 
the peak rates in the nineties. Once again, it seems apt to say that the 
anticipation of agency being usurped, of losing one’s place in the order 
of things, is fundamentally what drives the anxiety, depression and 
suicide associated with economic instability, an effect that is amplified 
if one’s agency in the political arena is also threatened.
Another relationship between political stability and suicide is 
Durkheim’s finding that suicide rates are higher in times of peace than 
in war, a finding that has since been confirmed in more contemporary 
studies of the phenomenon (Osman and Parnell 2015). War generally 
tends to be a collective dissent towards an external threat, and therefore 
demands alignment towards common goals―a high degree of social 
integration. In contrast, in times of relative peace, internal issues 
become more focal and so the opportunity for a relative loss of social 
integration is greater, hence the increase in suicide rate. The exception 
to this, of course, is war waged within a state, referring to Durkheim’s 
point concerning political volatility and suicide.
5.2.3 Suicide, Marital Status and Religious Affiliation
The religious “nones” are spiritually hungry, but they are not finding 
anything to satisfy that hunger. They are the most demonstrable 
microcosm of the effect of worldview famine. Accordingly, suicide 
rates tend to be higher among the “nones” than the religiously 
affiliated both within a society (Dervic et al. 2004; Hilton, Fellingham, 
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and Lyon 2002), and when the religiosity of different societies 
are compared (Stack 1983; Bertolote and Fleischmann 2002). The 
religiously disaffiliated also marry and have families less frequently, 
and tend to be more isolated from their relations (Dervic et al. 
2004). Independently, it has been established that marriage has a 
protective effect on suicide (Kposowa 2000; Rotermann 2007). This 
suggests a curious trend among the religiously disaffiliated: they 
comprehensively reject or are otherwise unable to participate in 
major sources of social integration and meaning in life, and therefore 
systematically lose multiple, independent safeguards against suicide. 
That the fastest growing religion is no religion at all, as discussed 
in section 5.1, overwhelmingly signifies that religion no longer 
guarantees such a safeguard; its promise of a meaningful life is 
bankrupt. The Death of a binding social and religious metanarrative 
spells death for individuals.
Altogether, the rising tide of suicide may indicate that our 
economic, political, religious and social institutions are failing 
individuals, and are impotent in helping them to find their place. 
They fail doubly, too, as they are also unable to point to alternative 
viable means of engaging with the world distinct from the crumbling 
ones they offer. As evidenced by the rise of isolated spiritual “nones” 
and non-voters, people are actively dissenting from these institutions. 
Without one’s place, and bankrupt of alternatives, hope is a luxury 
one cannot afford, inviting the systematic and self-reinforcing 
despair from which suicide can follow. As Popper (1979) said, our 
great strength is that we can let our ideas “die in our stead”. When 
we are starved of alternatives, when there are no ideas left to die in 
us, perhaps death of the body inevitably follows. Culture, as it takes 
root in the individual, no longer serves to orient the agent in either 
itself or its arena meaningfully. The self is no longer at home in itself: 
suicide is domicide in its most interior, personal and radical form. 
In this sense, the zombie is suicide aborted. The seed of culture has 
miscarried in the zombie, and the hunger for a way out, rather than 
ending itself in a final act of agency, has mutated into the insatiable 
craving for the sapience lost―a literal hunger for brains.
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5.3 Pestilence
Fig. 11: Prevalence of the words “zombie” and “disconnection” from 
1930-2010 in predominantly English books published in any country.20 
Culture also informs us in relation to how we should orient ourselves 
to others, and critically, zombies lack any meaningful relationship to 
one another. People are fleeing the collapsing sacred canopies once 
provided by world religions, flocking instead beneath the makeshift 
tarps of Ersatz mythologies. These echoes of meta-meaning systems, 
while offering wisps of comfort, cannot afford the complete existential 
import of a genuine meta-meaning system. Owing to their virtuality, 
they ultimately fail at providing one of the central things they are sought 
out for―close interpersonal relationships―inflicting a myopia that 
seems to make people more distant to us. They are not far-reaching and 
general enough to make others intelligible to us across all the domains 
that life demands.
Evidence from the General Social Survey (GSS) paints a bleak picture 
of our interpersonal engagement. From 1985 to 2004, the proportion of 
people who report having no one to discuss important matters with nearly 
tripled, with people reported having 2/3 the number of confidantes than 
in 1985 (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006). While some have 
disputed these results, citing possible technical issues (Fischer 2009), even 
20  From Google N-Gram Viewer, smoothing factor of 3 (Michel et al. 2011).
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the most conservative modelling of the data suggests a 70% increase in the 
number of people who report having no confidantes (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Brashears 2009). As the Pew Research Center corroborates, 
there is “no ‘smoking gun’ that clearly demonstrates a technical problem 
with the GSS data”,21 suggesting that the backlash is at least in part as a 
result of the sheer incredulity towards the data. Pew also found a 30% 
decrease in the size of core discussion networks.
Internet and mobile phone users, however, had a more diverse (25%) 
and a slightly larger (12%) social network than non-users. In the UK, time 
spent on the internet by adults has more than doubled from 9.9 hours 
per week in 2005 to 20.5 in 2014.22 This is close to the worldwide median 
average of 18 hours per week as of 2015.23 Youth aged 16-24 spend more 
than 27 hours per week online. Given that 40% of time spent on the 
internet is split between social media (22.7%), gaming (10.2%) and email 
(8.3%), activities that are of a decidedly social character,24 this modest 
increase in social network size and diversity is hardly commensurate 
with the effort and energy expended. That internet and mobile phone 
users have richer social networks than non-users, however, suggests 
that technology is not itself to blame per se. The quantity and quality of 
our social relationships have perceptibly suffered for reasons that seem 
to be largely independent from the rise in use of these technologies. The 
want of individuals to “plug in” and stay connected appears to coincide 
with the massive disconnection they are experiencing.
Marriage, as a cultural and religious institution meant to foster and 
protect some of our closest relationships, seems to be failing as well. 
According to a Pew Research Poll, while the number of marriages in 
2010 decreased by 28% since 1960, the number of divorces increased 
by 280%. Almost a third of adults have never married, compared to 
half that in 1960. And while divorce is on the rise, so is the number 
21  http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_
Social_Isolation.pdf 





23  http://www.statista.com/statistics/267518/weekly-internet-usage-worldwide/ 
24  http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2010/what-americans-do-online-
social-media-and-games-dominate-activity.html 
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of prenuptial agreements, according to a survey conducted by the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. The survey noted that 
63% of lawyers reported an increase in prenuptial agreements from 
2010-2013, and that prenuptial agreements have also been on the rise 
for the past 30 years.25 Though prenuptial agreements are fairly rare 
(only about 5% of marriages), their rise may be telling of an increasing 
mistrust of the institution, predicated on a pessimism and premonition 
of failure. That we are increasingly inclined to place more faith in our 
money than in other persons is troubling.
This is particularly ironic considering the economic incentives for 
marriage. On average, the earning potential for married households is 
41% greater than for the non-married. And this has actually increased 
from only 12% in 1960.26 Although people are marrying later in life, 
and people with higher education are more likely to marry―both of 
which contribute to earning potential―fiscal stability is often cited as 
a major consideration in the choice of partner, irrespective of personal 
socioeconomic status. 
Though marriage may be declining, the want for close interpersonal 
relationships and family is not. 98% of adults say family is one of the 
most important aspects of their lives, with 76% saying it is the most 
important thing in their lives. Just as we seem to be shirking from 
religion but still hunger for what it provides, the institution of marriage 
seems unable to ensure the holiness of matrimony, yet we still desire the 
closeness it once provided.27
There is a strong association between social isolation and suicide 
(Stravynski and Boyer 2011). Even discounting suicide, social isolation 
and loneliness increase mortality by 32% (Holt-Lunstad et al. 2015). As 
discussed in section 5.2.3, married individuals are also less likely to 
commit suicide (Kposowa 2000; Rotermann 2007). And so, we can begin 
to piece together a clockwork catastrophe whose ruin has been set into 
motion by the invisible hand of the meaning crisis. Suicide rates are 
on the rise. Social isolation is on the rise. Social isolation contributes to 
25  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303615304579157671554066120
26  http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage 
-and-rise-of-new-families/ 
27  The fact that the decline of marriage is concurrent with the rise of loneliness indicates 
that marriage is not simply being replaced by close, non-marital relationships
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suicide. Marriage decreases the likelihood of suicide (Kposowa 2000), 
and divorce rates are on the rise. Cultural involvement shields against 
suicide, and religious disaffiliation is on the rise. The religious “nones” 
feel that luck is more important than hard work, reflecting a damaged 
sense of self-efficacy and hopelessness.28 Systematic hopelessness can 
spiral into depression and social isolation. Untreated depression is the 
leading cause of suicide. A self-reinforcing system is thereby created, 
the causes and effects indistinguishable from each other. They are at 
war within themselves. It is as though we have tools that are no longer 
serving us, so we are wrenching at them, turning them over, trying 
desperately to find a way to keep them in use, as they blunt before our 
eyes, and we beat them ever more harshly.
5.4 War
If suicide evidences detachment from self, and the rise in divorce 
and social isolation indicates detachment from others, then political 
disengagement indicates an appreciable detachment from the state and 
from political machinery. In 2014, voter turnout for the midterm election 
in the US was the lowest it had been since World War II. Worldwide, 
the picture is just as troubling: since 1945, voter turnout in democratic 
countries has decreased by 12% (Pintor, Gratschew, and Sullivan 2002; 
Solijonov 2016). 
It seems that―as in the Hellenistic era―we are once again afflicted 
by a feeling of diminishment in our political agency, a loss of faith in the 
traction of political institutions, and a disbelief in the political apparatus 
as an instrument to underwrite the volition of society. But from here, 
the historical parallels are limited. While the anxiety triggered by 
modern Western pluralism (or in some cases, its perception) may well 
be compared to those experienced in the Hellenistic period, the causal 
parities are not nearly as obvious. This time, there is no single historical 
shift―even the fall of the Soviet Union, or some significant event 
besides―that bears responsibility for the reduced political motility, or 
for general agnosticism toward political participation. The diffuseness 
of the trend makes it more difficult to source. 
28  http://www.statisticbrain.com/percent-who-believe-in-the-power-of-hard-work/ 
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The circularity of the political system poses another diagnostic 
problem. If we face deterioration in the efficacy in our political 
institutions, it is simultaneous with a divestment in the belief of its 
citizenry. What follows, it would seem, is a loosening of the relationship 
between the elected and their electorate, and between the individual 
and the institutions to which they ostensibly belong. Though political 
systems do not independently constitute worldviews (in the model 
of the meta-meaning system, the sphere of political relations is sub-
categorical to the parent function that religion once served) they do 
consist of an agent/arena ecology similar to that of the larger worldview. 
If this relation becomes unglued, then the system―dependent upon 
the mutual fittedness and interdefinition between the institutions and 
the participants―is no longer sustainable. If individuals are no longer 
inclined to participate meaningfully in the political process to at least a 
minimum standard, then the system is severely at risk of failure. 
There are clear signs that such a failure is occurring, and for these we 
need look no further than to the centre of our modern political nervous 
system. In the first section of this book, we discussed the breakdown 
of Americanism, and the cultural discontinuities that are threatening 
to dilute the potency of the “American” signifier. America is the most 
powerful political entity of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and 
it serves as a paradigm for the health of the democratic political machinery 
and its requisite social capital. We proposed in section 2 that a vernacular 
religiosity powered the apotheosis of American identification, and that 
the vitality of its institutions―politics included―was linked to a “faith 
in America” which was at once religious and not exclusively religious. 
This faith was a paragon of worldview attunement, the hub at the centre 
of a moving wheel, anchoring all spokes of American life and culture. 
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the decline of religious 
participation (our first horseman) in the United States, exemplified by 
the rise of the “nones”, has prefigured the disunion of the political agent 
and arena. If both losses are generalizable in the West at large, it seems 
plausible to suggest that, even on this scale, the two types of agnostics 
are co-emergent. Analysis of exit poll data for the 2014 US midterm 
election, for instance, reveals that although the “nones” constitute an 
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increasingly larger sect of the population, they still only constitute 
around 12% of voters, unchanged since 2006.29
Furthermore, the growing sense of velleity in civic participation 
seems at odds with the advocacy-driven, often intractable politics related 
to our social and cultural dilemmas.30 However apathetic we may be 
toward the formal offices of politics, we are increasingly politicized on 
the topics of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, and religious affiliation 
(or lack thereof), and increasingly trenchant about staking and 
defending our identities therein. It seems plausible that our elevated 
identification with these modalities is also symptomatic of our cultural 
domicide; it is a victual substitute for religious involvement, satiating 
our appetites for community and social coherence. In the absence of 
our sacred canopy, these partial modes of identification are overdrawn 
to meet the elements. They are exapted as pseudo-religious domiciles, 
shelters of culture to huddle within as we fend off encroachment by the 
zombies―elements of “strangeness” in the post-war world.31 
These pseudo-religious domiciles, drawn from the matrix of social 
identities are attempting to cheat Death by anesthetizing the symptoms 
of the other three horsemen; countering Famine with self-affirmation, 
fighting Pestilence with tribalism, and parrying War with politicization. 
In doing so, they are colligating each sphere of relations through a 
singular framework, like beams of light concentrated through a prism.
The problem with these worldview substitutes is that they are 
inhibited by procrustean heuristics. Though they can virtually govern 
their existing denizens (advocates or members), they cannot suffice 
as meta-meaning systems precisely because they already function 
as single-meaning systems―they relate to one mode of identification, 
and they do not have the versatility to appropriate other systems 
29  http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/05/how-the-faithful-voted-2014-preliminary-
analysis/ 
30  It is worth noting that the increase in protest, advocacy and intense politicization 
in the wake of Trump’s election has not translated into participation in the actual 
political machinery available (i.e. anti-Trump sentiment seems not to have drawn 
people to the Democratic Party or otherwise resulted in the emergence of new 
political entities).
31  We are speaking here of the dichotomy between two increasingly contrasting 
phenomena: general civic apathy and politicized modes of identification. We are 
not disputing the existence of valid political causes or the integrity of advocacy 
independent from any cultural meaning crisis. 
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or identities. Neither do they become more complex as part of their 
function. Uniform collectives offer insulation rather than social 
exposure or diversification. Political advocacy often centers on specific 
topics rather than generalizable patterns or dynamics. And as would-be 
comprehensive frameworks, single systems are necessarily reductive; 
they attempt to integrate phenomena into an explanatory framework, 
but those frameworks have limited usefulness because they are only 
applicable to the system from which they originate. Like the Ersatz 
mythologies discussed in section 5.1, they cannot export a prescription 
for action that becomes useful even when placed in multiple domains 
or situations. The fact that one group finds a system deeply meaningful 
does not define that system as a worldview. It is wide and efficacious 
applicability among different groups that makes it a worldview.
It is telling perhaps that these modes of identification have become 
increasingly political when our participation in politics has declined 
so appreciably. We may venture to say that the politicization of social 
identities is a reaction to the divestment from the political process as 
such―a process that was once chief inheritor to the religious worldview. 
Consequently, it is likely that our recent divestment from politics qua 
politics is, at least in part, responsive to the disastrous outcome of the 
political deification that occurred in the twentieth century. 
As politics is, by necessity of governance, naturally integrative 
of other systems, it was a proximal replacement for the meta-
meaningfulness of religion at the end of the nineteenth century. Though 
the machinations of politics and political identification historically fell 
under the normativity of the religious canopy, its systemic complexity 
made it the nearest and most convincing imitator of that normativity as 
the influence of religion diminished. The twentieth century therefore 
bore witness to the rise of the most potent political pseudo-religions 
we have known in the modern world. These of course, were the 
totalitarian, nationalist ideologies of Marxism, espoused by the Soviet 
Union, and National Socialism, espoused by Nazi Germany midway 
through the century. Not merely instruments of governance, these 
political ideologies grew to espouse a creedal fundamentalism we 
might equate with the most zealous form of religious fealty. They were 
not merely inhibitive, as other pseudo-religious substitutes described 
above, but widely destructive. The historical conflagrations here 
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are well known to us: though they galvanized millions of adherents 
initially, these political ideologies were so ill-adapted to the religious 
project that they conditioned unprecedented scales of violence and 
genocide. The horseman of War is uncannily suited to describe the fate 
of these pseudo-religions as they became more and more widespread 
throughout Europe, Asia and the Americas. 
If once again we take the relocation of the Grassy Narrows as an 
analogue for spiritual domicide, we might say that the totalitarian 
political ideologies of the twentieth century were the square walls 
superimposed onto the circular dynamic of the religious worldview 
(and in this case, infinitely more overweening). Likewise, the 4th century 
domicide after the death of Alexander shows us what may ensue when 
great seats of power fail and diminish. In the wake of the last century, 
it became clear that if political systems aspired in earnest to a religious 
level of meta-meaning, they would not only be insufficient, but also 
inimical to our culture and way of life. It is perhaps little surprise, then, 
that voter turnout has declined since the fall of Nazi Germany. The 
notion that politics, operating as a superordinate governor, can offer 
anything remotely like spiritual restitution, is no longer au courant. 
Though pseudo-religious nationalism is by no means extinguished, 
our culture’s relationship to the political establishment has changed 
drastically since the last World War. Voter turnout rates illustrate this, 
and so do the prevailing attitudes expressed in our popular culture. The 
rabid fundamentalism of the twentieth century ideologues has, when 
not transferred to the social enclaves described above, largely been 
replaced with an obverse attitude: cynicism. Rather than the majority 
of individuals identifying strongly with specific political parties or 
organizations, many reject the pretention of any political membership 
at all. Like the religious “nones”, the non-affiliation does not reflect 
an insouciance towards political agency, but merely a lack of faith in 
the efficacy of the existing political architecture―hence, a comparable 
breakdown of the agent/arena ecology, conditioned by a disbelief in the 
relation itself.
As cynicism is aloof by orientation, it is more spontaneous, and a 
more difficult phenomenon to demystify than ideological zealousness. 
In this way, it bears some attitudinal affinity with the decentralized, 
equivocal structures found in capitalist systems (see also Moreman 2010; 
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Webb and Byrnand 2008). There appears to be some correspondence 
between the pervasiveness of these two Western hallmarks, capitalism 
and cynicism―a sense of inscrutability, a difficulty with determining 
accountability, and most of all, an inability to ascertain our own influence 
on such a system (recall: the Grassy Narrows elder’s meditations, and 
the Hellenistic estrangement between individual and the structures of 
the state). All of this conduces to a Kafkaesque sense of detachment; the 
perception that an individual’s actions are futile in a world where causal 
rules are oblique. It also increases the number of unaffiliated persons as 
people find less and less of themselves in the institutions they work for,32 
in the governments that represent them, and in the monetary structures 
that they must use to fulfill their homeostatic needs.
Our cultural cynicism seems germane to our feeling of futility, which 
in turn refers us to our Kafkaesque impression of absurdity from the 
world outside. Accentuating this impression is the loss of some central 
adhesive to our perspectives; our ability to index our environment―
to gain a readable purchase over our surroundings―is waning. This 
is because the information we obtain from the world, which becomes 
the epistemic leverage in our decision making, has never been more 
unreliable. Abundance is one dimension of this problem; one need look 
no further than news media to appreciate the sheer volume of (often 
irreconcilable) narratives that compete for authority over our attention. 
Far more critical, however, is the degree to which these narratives are 
unconcerned with their own verity, and whether the impetus for their 
communication has anything at all do with their relationship to reality 
as such (see also Keyes 2004).
This lingering question now casts doubt over the trustworthiness 
of all but the most verifiable assertions, whether they are made by 
individuals, groups or entire states. The degree to which the contents 
of published works, the utterances of politicians, the press releases of 
institutions and the opinions of individuals are rhetorically attractive 
is not, of course, the degree to which they are true. Yet we feel with 
increasing dismay that the attractiveness of our expressions is favored 
32  In the US, employee engagement hovers around 30% (http://www.gallup.com/
topic/employee_engagement.aspx), and a worldwide survey of 142 countries 
revealed that only 13% of employees describe themselves as engaged in their work 
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engaged-work.aspx).
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over the soundness of their claims. The prioritization of appearance 
over reality, duplicated noisily in our social media driven environment, 
and appropriated to great effect by the political establishment, has 
reinforced and empowered our cynicism. Nowhere is this magnification 
more evident than in the rise of satirical news programs, which 
recapitulate political doublespeak as the basis of their comedy. Far from 
being persuasive, these programs presuppose the cynicism of their 
viewership, and this is the basis of their success. The disingenuousness 
of our institutions has long since been taken for granted, and on several 
occasions (one famous instance took place during Jon Stewart’s final 
moments as host of the Daily Show) it has been given a recognizable 
signifier. To understand the signifier properly, we must look to a famous 
essay on the subject by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt: “On Bullshit” 
(Frankfurt and Wilson 2005).
5.4.1 Reality Disengaged: On Bullshit
Fig. 12: Prevalence of the use of the words “zombie” and “bullshit” from 
1930-2008 in predominantly English books published in any country.33
It is very important, in Frankfurt’s formulation, not to confuse bullshit 
with a lie. The two differ in one all-important respect―namely, in 
their relationship with the truth. A lie and truth share something very 
significant: they share a concern for realness. The liar and the truth-teller 
33  From Google N-Gram Viewer, smoothing factor of 3 (Michel et al. 2011).
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possess a mutual appreciation for the depth of genuineness because in 
the case of both, that depth is the referent for their actions―supported 
by the truth teller or subverted by the liar. The lie and the truth both 
presuppose an appreciation of the actuality they treat. The liar must 
know the truth in order to identify it, and she must find it consequential 
for want to sabotage it. A lie is told to purposefully controvert the truth―
it presupposes the importance of truth in desiring to undermine it. We 
might say then that a lie is told with respect to the truth. Mindfulness 
of the truth is essential to the projects of both the liar and the truth-
teller. Bullshit is so defined because it is not troubled in the least with 
actuality. Bullshit may be true or untrue. Either way, it is unconcerned. 
It has no commitment to the truth for better or for worse. It publishes 
itself irrespective to the status of its own reality. 
Frankfurt’s (2005) theoretical explication of bullshit aids in 
conceptualizing self-deception far more effectively than lying does. 
Human beings cannot lie to themselves. We cannot know “p” and then 
promptly believe “not p”. We cannot know we have $1,000 dollars in the 
bank account and then believe that we have $100,000. Even if we desire 
to, we cannot knowingly invert our apprehension of the truth. Lying to 
oneself is an inadequate, unhelpful model for explaining self-deception.
Bullshit is not about making things real, it is about making things 
salient. The bullshitter means to direct your attention not to the truth 
or untruth of an idea, but to the catchiness of an idea: a politician tells 
a crowd of applauding supporters that their country is the best in the 
world; a commercial shows beautiful women clinging to the arms of a 
gawky man as he opens a bottle of beer; a company changes the color 
of their brand and calls it “new and improved”; a student prints her 
essay on a smoother stationary before handing it in to be marked. 
Everyone knows the attractiveness of these objects is both irrational 
and immaterial. The crowd before the politician knows full well that 
their country is in dire straits but they applaud anyway. The professor 
reading the paper knows it is not well argued but enjoys turning the 
pages. Grocery shoppers can see that the ingredients of the cereal brand 
haven’t changed, but they’re tempted to buy the new box. Male viewers 
are well aware that holding a particular label of beer will not enhance 
their sexual appeal. And yet in spite all of this knowing, they are still 
likely to buy that particular beer. This salience slippage is not a rational 
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phenomenon. We know there is no truth to any of these associations. 
Even the brands admit (and often wink at) the fact that the images most 
identified with their brands depict false correlations. Yet this is not 
scandalous to anyone because the branders are not making propositions 
that we consider on the basis of their being true or false. Nor, oftentimes, 
is the politician. She is not making an argument using the elements of 
reason. She is giving herself an extra sheen of salience. Salience grabs 
your attention, but by directing your attention, you can make things 
salient so that they grab your attention even more. The directives of 
that salience can be entirely disconnected from the depth of realness, 
and when this happens, you seek merely the catchiness of the idea, 
the person, or the prospect, and not the substance of its consequence 
or the reservoir of its competence. You can bullshit yourself merely by 
directing your attention to certain things over others, selecting certain 
details over others, and choosing certain expressions over others simply 
because they come to you more quickly… because you have conditioned 
yourself to favor them automatically. We can build a commitment to 
models of thinking and acting solely based on their salience. We can 
condition ourselves into retaining an idea regardless of its integrity. Our 
concern for relevance can come at the cost of our concern for truth. This 
begins a circle of self-deceptive behavior. 
Bullshit and self-deception are infectiously versatile. They can be 
transmitted by individuals and institutions alike, and in many cases 
adhere the relationship between the two. As one may imagine, this is 
poisonous for the agent/arena ecology. If the basis of this relation is 
polluted by bullshit, it can have one of two deleterious outcomes. It 
may inspire heedlessness on the part of the agent, in which her attention 
becomes attracted only to salience, and her beliefs and orientations 
become completely subsumed into the purported appearances of an 
individual, institution or set of ideas. This complete surrender to self-
deception makes her extremely vulnerable to ideological extremism 
and fundamentalism. Vigorous cynicism is the other outcome, whereby 
the individual dismisses herself from involvement in any of these 
relations. She assumes a position of absolute disbelief and forecloses the 
possibility of partaking in the ecology, even where it is unpolluted, and 
would connect her meaningfully to the world. 
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Significantly, these two positions are not mutually exclusive, nor as 
distinguishable as they would seem. Heedless belief often transforms into 
cynicism when a once undiscerning individual is abruptly disillusioned. 
Inversely, we have said that cynicism does not remove the appetite for 
authenticity, and in the case of political relationships, cynicism can be 
appropriated when it becomes its own basis for political mobilization. 
Ironically, devout cynicism can make an individual vulnerable to self-
deception when it affectively bonds her to other, similar expressions, 
such that it becomes the singular criterion that guides her relationships 
and involvement with the world. Singular criteria like this provide 
dangerously low thresholds for influence and persuasion.
We are presently seeing the inter-penetration of these two forms of 
self-deception in political arenas around the world. Yet again, nowhere 
is the evidence more powerful than in the United States. The decline 
of the American religiosity, the disproportionately pale declarations 
of pseudo-religious substitutes, and the overall disbelief in the 
communicability of truth in politics has suffused the culture with a 
sense of disenfranchisement. The feeling of futility embedded in this 
overall zeitgeist has proved volatile, and has inspired increasingly 
radical demonstrations against the “establishment” viz. not only sitting 
governments or institutions, but the systemic environment (read: 
ecology) in which they operate. Unsurprisingly, these demonstrations 
have often struggled to articulate the complexity of their grievances. 
In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement declared itself against the 
absurd inequalities of capitalism writ large. The election year of 2016 
saw the rise of political candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 
who, each in their partisan vestments, spoke glibly about the erosion 
of the American apotheosis and electrified the electorate with an 
uncommonly radical denunciation of the American establishment and 
their solidarity with the disenfranchised. Their perceived “authenticity” 
(whether genuine or not) has been embraced as a counterpoise to the 
quotidian bullshit of everyday life―a war, as it were, against the 
stultification of civilian life, and the rediscovery of a “greatness” that is 
barely recollected.

6. An Introduction to the Genealogy 
of the Meaning Crisis
In section 4, we discussed the modern domicide of the Grassy Narrows 
First Nation, and the historical domicide of the Hellenistic Era. Now, 
we turn our attention to a more encompassing historical domicide. The 
meaning crisis has its historical origins in the disintegration of three 
very powerful orders of a worldview that had previously helped us to 
make sense of the world. We provide an overview of this genealogy 
in the following section, reserving a more extensive discussion for a 
forthcoming monograph.1 
6.1 The Meaning that Was Lost:  
Three Orders of a Worldview
6.1.1 Nomological Order 
The first of these connections was cradled by the Aristotelean worldview, 
where there existed a powerful affinity between objective reality and 
subjective perception. This worldview had two components: an account 
of how the mind viewed the world, and an account of how that world 
was structured. For Aristotle, these accounts were integrated and 
mutually supporting. To know something was to understand its form, 
1  See Mark Taylor’s After God as a work influencing the arguments in this section 
(Taylor 2007).
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but “form” didn’t primarily mean the shape of a thing. It meant the deep 
structure that governed its organization. A bird, for instance, was not 
constituted by features and anatomy (feathers, talons, beak, flight, etc.) 
but from the underlying structure by which these features were cohered 
and animated. And just as hand conforms to the spatial organization of 
an object when grasping it, so does the mind conform to the structural 
organization of the world when it notionally grasps its structure. This 
was the Aristotelean knowing, a deep, structural conformity between 
mind and world. 
One of the most fortifying elements of Aristotle’s worldview 
was that it allowed criteria for falsification, a checklist for reliably 
determining whether or not something in the world was real: (1) ensure 
the perceiving organ was not malfunctioning (i.e. the quality of our 
eyesight), (2) that the intervening medium was not distorted (clarity of 
day or night) and (3) that the perception had consensus with others. 
Perception that passes these tests imbues information―it possesses the 
perceiving individual of the form of the thing perceived. 
Aristotle’s affinity between mind and world extended and reflected 
the mind’s intentionality into the properties of the universe. Everything 
moved with purpose in this worldview, and an intrinsic sense of 
belonging coordinated the natural direction of all actions and objects 
(smoke to clouds, objects to earth, etc.). The earth was at the centre of a 
purposeful cosmos, an inherently beautiful and ordered place that made 
sense to us, resonated with our experience and gave us the sense of 
understanding the world and our place within it. Since it has to do with 
the fundamental principles by which knowledge and reality co-operate, 
we call this worldview the Nomological Order (“nomos” means law or 
rule). 
6.1.2 Narrative Order 
Aristotle’s purposeful worldview was so compelling that when 
Christian thinkers encountered it in the Middle Ages, they found 
it threatening to their theology, but impossible to ignore. The most 
influential of these thinkers, Thomas Aquinas, worked hard to integrate 
Aristotle’s metaphysics with important ordonnances of the Christian 
worldview. Yet there was an important change in the adaptation of the 
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Aristotelean framework. In the Greek world, time, like the heavens, 
was understood as a cyclical movement. For the Christians however, 
following the Jews and Zoroastrians before them, time was a line with 
a narrative, consisting of a beginning, middle, and end. Moreover, it 
was the unfolding of a story: the creation, fall, and redemption of the 
world. This metanarrative, applied to Aristotle’s purposeful cosmos, 
anchored the affinity of person and universe to the symbolic narrative 
of Christ’s death and resurrection. This singular, intervening event 
turned the repeating cycle into a single arc, creating a definite telos 
within a single cosmic story, and a climax for all converging purposes 
in Aristotle’s perfectly cohered universe. 
This metanarrative teleology, which we will call the Narrative Order, 
provided an overarching story into which the minutia of the cosmos―
individuals and their own stories―could fit and belong. Further, it 
introduced the idea that the agency of persons could intervene in 
the cycle of repetition and meaningfully impact the course of cosmic 
history. 
6.1.3 Normative Order
Thomas Aquinas was also instrumental to the emergence of a third 
order, born from a marriage of Greek and Christian spirituality. The 
former, originating with Plato and Aristotle, emphasized a process of 
rational self-transcendence. For Aristotle, “form” was the blueprint of 
intelligible structure for all reality’s objects. The stuff that it imbued 
with organization was otherwise unstructured and chaotic. Aristotle 
called this stuff “matter”―not physical material, but pure, formless 
potential that was unknowable in nature. Form created a purposed 
reality from matter, just as a chair is made from wood that could 
otherwise be used to make a variety of other objects. It is the form of 
“chair” that fashions the object from the material. Form was the DNA 
that turned inanimate matter into life. It in-formed mere possibility 
with knowable, intelligible reality. 
In Aristotle’s framework, form was not simply a binary to matter, 
but marked a scale of being with increasing rationality, a hierarchy 
of complexity and intelligibility. Living beings were more in-formed 
than inanimate objects because their form had agency. They were 
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self-moving. Human beings were more in-formed still, not only 
self-moving, but self-moving in thought―rational, self-realizing, 
and commensurately more real. For Plotinus, who integrated Plato 
and Aristotle, this rising scale of realness marked a journey to self-
transcendence and realization. It reflected a fundamental desire to 
deepen one’s connection with reality. This insight was powerful. It 
connected the rationality of self-movement to the process of realization: 
the more rational a being, the more it structurally organized itself to 
become more real, and the more connected it became to the structure 
of reality as such. 
For Christian thinkers in the ancient world, such as Augustine 
(who read Plotinus), this pursuit of rational self-realization and self-
transcendence, i.e. the pursuit of wisdom, was motivated, as Plato 
had realized, by a deep love for what is real. For Augustine, reason’s 
capacity for self-transcendence was dependent on this Platonic desire, 
and it drove a process of ascension whereby we could transcend our 
reason and be in conformity to ultimate reality, a mystical union 
with God. Love was an extension of Aristotle’s rational process, and 
drove the practices of reason and wisdom to form a Platonic-Christian 
spirituality that Aquinas was able to integrate into the Aristotelean 
worldview. The product of this integration was the Normative Order, 
reference to an ontological structure that connected us fundamentally 
to reality, and therein, in-formed us about the nature of good, setting 
forth a hierarchy of values that could tell us what to seek and what to 
love, that we may ascend the levels of reality and fulfill the potential 
of our self-moving, rational soul. 
These three orders, the Nomological Order, the Narrative Order, 
and the Normative Order, became tightly integrated and mutually 
supporting. The story of God’s love (narrative order) inspired the 
rational-mystical ascension to God (normative order) through the 
deep connection between the rational mind and the structure of the 
cosmos (nomological order). The world was inherently meaningful, 
beautiful, rational, valuable, and spiritual. We were all tightly 
connected to this cosmos, and we had a coherent place and purpose 
within it. 
 776. An Introduction to the Genealogy of the Meaning Crisis
6.2 How the Meaning Was Lost: The Fall of the 
Three Orders
6.2.1 Supremacy of Will over Reason 
The unravelling of the three orders is not a single historical incident, 
but was likely preconditioned by the Black Death in Europe. The plague 
created a significant labor shortage that sparked a sudden increase 
in demographic relocation. The abrupt trauma to Europe’s social 
structures, combined with increased economic self-reliance, gave rise 
to a new sense of personal self-determination. This expressed itself 
spiritually as well as economically. Within Germany, the Rhineland 
mystics began to articulate a new understanding of mystical experience 
and the spiritual life. The ascent to God within the normative order was 
still driven by love, but it was now understood as a force of will instead 
of the self-transcendence of reason. Mystical experience was no longer 
seen as the culmination of human rationality, but as a self-negation 
of the will, a re-ordering of the psyche that created an emptiness into 
which God’s will would flow. The ascent to God through Platonic love 
was replaced by the descent of God into the vacancy of the self, which 
was no longer something to be completed or perfected, but something 
an individual must shed to make room for the divine. 
This new form of spirituality had important implications for how 
people of the middle ages understood God. William of Ockham and 
other similar-minded theologians posited that God’s will was prior (and 
not beholden) to His reason. With Thomas Aquinas, God’s rationality 
had been central; with Ockham, God’s will was central, causative of all 
order and rationality. Ockham also concluded that, correspondingly, 
any order that human beings found in their experience of the world 
was constituted linguistically, and arbitrarily. This nominalism 
amounted to a kind of radical individualism, in which any taxonomy 
that arranged objects or entities (i.e. a forest comprised of trees) was 
a contrivance of individual will rather than a connection that was 
inherent to the cosmos. God’s will was, above all, the determination of 
all order and rationality. 
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It is perhaps no coincidence that the emphasis on freedom and will 
that emerged from the Black Plague correlated with the explosion of 
creativity in the Renaissance. However, there was also horror in this new 
vision. The decentering of reason from the Normative Order meant that 
the mind’s connection to the world had been greatly diminished. The 
divine had become something non-rational and arbitrary, almost absurd, 
and the inherent meaning of Aristotle and Aquinas’ worldviews had been 
replaced by a gnawing sense that everything―including the self―was 
ephemeral, strange, and something other than we thought it to be. This 
primacy of the will undermined the notion of an ontological structure 
imbued with intrinsic value. It annulled the marriage between the rational 
and the mystical that had been so essential to the Normative Order.
6.2.2 Luther and the Narcissistic Self
Over a century after the onset of the Black Death, theologian Martin 
Luther, backgrounded by the chaos of the times, was bringing together 
influences from Rhineland mysticism and Ockham’s theology. Luther 
was an Augustinian monk, and like Augustine himself, he had identified 
with the tremendous internal conflict and self-loathing expressed in the 
writings of St. Paul. Luther experienced the self-negation of Rhineland 
mysticism more as a self-loathing, intrinsic to a degenerate self that 
was both reflexively obsessed and dissatisfied. Luther wasn’t seeking 
a mystical experience, but the same loss of self that the mystics sought 
to escape the narcissistic torment of their own self-preoccupation. Since 
the self was vacuous and self-destructive, it could not be the vessel 
for salvation. Any normative transformation had to be imposed from 
without by God’s will, which was raw, non-rational, and terrifyingly 
arbitrary. Luther’s doctrine of grace and faith was the non-rational 
acceptance of this arbitrary will. 
As Luther’s Protestant Reformation grew, much of Europe came to 
be dominated by these theological ideas, and they developed a deep 
foothold in Western culture. Faith and salvation became personal rather 
than collective undertakings, and individual conscience and choice 
became favored over institution and tradition. The mind’s most secure 
and meaningful connection was no longer with the world, but with 
itself. Luther argued for a priesthood of all believers, a radical kind of 
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equality in the church without clerical authorities. In this way, Luther’s 
Protestantism help to prepare the way for political democracy. 
For all his progressiveness, Luther’s views also contributed 
significantly to the development of the meaning crisis. In Luther’s 
Protestantism, the self most authentically experienced itself in the 
turmoil of self-loathing, and in the pursuit of God’s unearned grace, 
His external validation. Without this validation, the spread of Luther’s 
theology amounted to, among other things, a cultural training in 
narcissism; people were trained to seek external, unearned validation to 
compensate for the notion of a vacuous, self-loathing self. Meanwhile, 
Protestantism began fracturing into an ever-growing number of sects. 
Such expanding pluralism, combined with the radical individualism 
of Protestantism, meant that God increasingly became a purely private 
matter of internal experience. Not only did “God” refer to something 
arbitrary and absurd, it no longer referred to the same thing for different 
people. The term was starting to become meaningless. 
Luther’s rejection of tradition and institution meant a transference of 
spiritual life from the institution to the home, and into one’s daily work. 
Consequently, the monasteries were shut down in Protestant countries. 
Until that time, the monastery and the university had been complementary 
institutions; the latter served the acquisition of knowledge, and the 
former was the place wherein an individual cultivated wisdom, and 
trained a spiritual process of self-transformation and self-transcendence. 
These institutions and their associated functions were complementary 
educators. With the disappearance of the monasteries, this balance 
was lost. Without a systemic way of cultivating wisdom, the growing 
narcissism trained by Luther’s theology―now focused in the everyday 
practices of home, work and family in which sacredness and spirituality 
were now abstracted―was unchecked within the broader culture. 
6.2.3 Pluralism and the Copernican Revolution 
The newly integrated senses of self-determination and individualism 
described above helped to foster a rise in commercialism as Europe 
began to recover from the Black Plague. There was a prevailing belief 
that an individual could alter one’s status through determined effort, 
and this belief seemed to engender increases in urbanization and trade. 
80 Zombies in Western Culture
By extension, this gave rise to unprecedented social diversity and created 
the need for efficient and impartial bureaucracies that could monitor 
and enforce the contracts so crucial to commercialism. The system of 
contracts reinforced the idea that human beings could be connected to 
each other outside of shared kinships or religious affiliation. Societies 
slowly began to become more pluralistic, and this further undermined 
the importance of a single order shared by all.
The engine of commercialism produced many unexpected 
innovations from the Middle Ages through to the Renaissance, and 
these innovations set the scene for the transformations to come. The 
complexities of long distance trading and commerce put collective 
pressure on the culture to develop better celestial navigation and 
mathematics to reduce the risk of losing ships at sea. This led to more 
careful collection of data about the heavens and calculations about 
the motions of heavenly bodies, revealing that the heavens were not 
behaving as predicted by the Aristotelean-Ptolemaic model. Pragmatic 
improvements to these mathematics inspired Copernicus’ astronomical 
revision that the sun, not the earth, was at the center of the known 
universe. 
The revolution triggered by Copernicus’ discovery upended the 
presumptions of Aristotle’s epistemology. It demonstrated that a 
person’s experience could pass each of Aristotle’s tests for reality―
perception, medium and consensus―and still be wrong. The quality 
of experience was now subjective. Mathematics, not experience, was 
now the measure of realness and the language of the universe. If our 
fundamental cosmic orientation was misconceived, then everything was 
now vulnerable to illusion. Suddenly the mind was no longer anchored 
to the structure of the cosmos, and Aristotle’s nomological order could 
no longer be trusted to keep us in conformity with the world.
Galileo took Copernicus’ revolution even further with his discovery 
of inertial motion, which revealed that things did not move because of 
an internal purpose or cosmic drive, but because of accidental external 
pushes from other, unintentional forces in the world. The loss of these 
drives implied that here was no overarching metanarrative at work 
within the cosmos, no story that enacted itself through the movements 
of objects and individuals. This meant that human beings were now 
strangers, alone with our intent, acting with determined purpose in a 
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world that fundamentally lacked it. The universe went from being a 
beautiful, living cosmos unfolding a great story to a lifeless series of 
random collisions signifying nothing. 
The dissonance between the human being’s experience of meaning 
and the purposeless vacuum introduced by Copernicus and Galileo’s 
discoveries inevitably interacted with Luther’s narcissistic self and 
arbitrary God. In consequence, the mind’s connection to reality―and 
the people and objects within it―was severed and the mind was trapped 
inside the illusion of its own experience. With the discovery of inertial 
motion, it became clear that matter was not the potential for form, but 
substance in its own right. Form was not, after all, the blueprint for cosmic 
purpose, but simply the result of how motion shaped matter. There 
was no value-based hierarchy governing reality any more than there 
was a great narrative to guide it. So there was no longer a nomological 
order uniting the mind to the world, no overarching narrative order 
providing the purpose for it all, and no normative order for ascending 
to the divine. 
The historical domicide described within the loss of these three 
orders represents a comprehensive breakdown of the agent-arena 
correspondence discussed in section 3.4.3, which is essential to creating 
and sustaining a worldview. Therefore, the symbol of the zombie 
apocalypse, elucidated by our four horsemen of the apocalypse (section 
5), exemplifies the loss of these orders in its portrayal of the “Gray Life” 
of the meaning crisis. 

7. Conclusion
Fig. 13: Prevalence of words from 1930-2010 in predominantly English 
books published in any country.1
Our four horsemen of the apocalypse are, like the zombie itself, 
mythograms for a crisis in meaning that is decentered from any particular 
object or symptom that may refer back to it. Just like our present 
ecological crisis, there is no single anthropogenic or historical cause; 
rather, it is emergent from the unpredictable combinations of historical 
and perennial forces that define the interactional tension between agent 
and arena. As such, there is no “silver technological bullet” to solve 
our ecological crisis, nor stake to vanquish our zombie apocalypse. It 
1  From Google N-Gram Viewer, smoothing factor of 3 (Michel et al. 2011).
© 2017 J. Vervaeke, C. Mastropietro, F. Miscevic, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0113.07
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is important to understand the implications of this. Responding to such 
an emergent problem is not simply a matter of doctoring. Communities 
of intelligent people can combine knowledge to triage problems in 
medicine, economics, and engineering, but resolving the problems 
discussed in the second half of this book requires more than simply 
pooling knowledge and resources; the solution, like the problem, must 
be more complex than the sum of these parts.
The problem seems sufficiently nebulous that we cannot ruminate 
our way out of it, and while it is not our intention to foreclose the 
possibilities that human ingenuity might bring to bear, the problem is 
likely too multifarious to be treated with any existing cultural apparatus. 
As we have argued, the only apparatus that provided a comprehensive 
worldview attunement―which could both empower and connect the 
arenas of individual, social, spiritual and political life in the way that we 
crave―is no longer a live option for us. 
It is not controversial to note that the features of our Christian 
worldview are the prime movers behind many of our cultural zeitgeists. 
If this is true, it is also likely that the rising popularity of the superhero 
myths and similar trends reflect an unconscious response to the loss 
of that worldview. These mythologies, as we have discussed, contain 
unmistakable recursions to Christian forms, and that these mythologies 
are so culturally powerful may suggest that our need for a religious 
worldview retains a powerful hold over us. Despite our increasing 
skepticism and secularity, we are continually referring back to our 
most known spiritual quantity. This paradox reveals a complicated 
tension: our research demonstrates that we are increasingly―and 
perhaps irreversibly―abdicating religious institutions, but our cultural 
mythologies depict us ever more desperately beholden to religious 
meanings. This tension is embodied in the religious “nones” who hang 
ambiguously between secular and religious identities, wanting for 
something that integrates and transcends the realness of both of these 
perspectives. 
A worldview that governed perspective for two millennia does not 
simply vanish. Its decline is gradual like that of many lesser empires. 
Its continued influence through the kaleidoscope of popular culture 
is a trailing therapy to disarm the nihilism of a secularizing world. 
Yet it is doomed to fail in this role. These mythologies that refer to 
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Christianity contain little that is new or revelatory, and their gesturing 
has an inert effect rather than a transcendent one. If this crisis has in 
part been induced by the decline of Christianity, then attempting 
to retrieve Christianity is an ill-fated attempt at a solution. The very 
hard problem is this: that we suffer a lack of viable alternatives. As we 
have discussed, twentieth century solutions to the problem of religious 
decline have resulted in the trauma of disastrous political ideologies. We 
are rightly wary of duplicating this result with another secular attempt 
at worldview attunement. Absent these meta-meaning systems―one 
diminishing, and the other counterfeit―the only alternative seems to be 
the raw domicide of nihilism. 
The impasse posed by this trilemma is a spiritual bankruptcy that 
cannot be thwarted by the benefit of historical hindsight; our only known 
cure for cultural domicide―the one that relieved the Hellenes―is now 
at the very centre of the ailment. The philosopher-as-physician was the 
fountainhead of Christianity’s spiritual framework, and our divestment 
from this framework foregrounds our current predicament. It remains 
unclear to what extent, and in what form, this framework can be 
salvaged in a secular world, and this is the most significant formulation 
of the problem we face as a society. This unanswered question, while 
outside the scope of this discussion, will be the subject of the authors’ 
forthcoming work. 
Our spiritual bankruptcy, deepened and exacerbated by the 
symptoms of crisis in each of our horseman’s domains, are symbolized 
powerfully by the zombie apocalypse: by the vapid environment, the 
craving monster, the perverted transformation of world, the lack of 
instructive precedent, and the absence of an apparatus to treat or to 
explain. The growing recognition that there is no single technological 
solution to the environmental crisis corresponds to the lack of stake 
or silver bullet for a zombie apocalypse. The semiosis of the zombie’s 
physicality, the ambiguity around its name and iconicity, its subversion 
of archetypally heroic narratives and its undermining of our purchase on 
realness: all of this serves to make the zombie an exegetically polymorphic 
monster―a versatile symbol for despair, decay and faithlessness. That 
the zombie’s myth centers on the abjection of Christian apocalypse and 
resurrection suggests that its evolution is culturally responsive to the 
eclipse of the religious worldview, reflecting a loss of normative agency 
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and emblematizing the estrangement of individuals from one another 
and the infertility of their ecology with the world. 
It is important for the authors to stress that we are not resigned to 
the nihilism described in this book. To say that a problem is not easily 
solved is not to say that it is unsolvable. Rather, the purpose of this work 
has been to articulate the ways in which the symbol of this prominent 
cultural zeitgeist correlate to the decline of the Christian worldview, and 
to the many forms of crises that seem in turn connected to this decline. 
It remains imperative not to permit the voguishness of the zombie 
zeitgeist to undermine its philosophical import when appreciating the 
impact of a crisis in meaning, nor to reductively attribute the zeitgeist 
to any single horseman of crisis discussed in this book. The effects of 
both the Grassy Narrows and Hellenistic domicides discussed in section 
4 adduce the gravity of consequence that follows the disintegration of 
a meta-meaning system. A comparable disintegration is extant; the 
zombie is a multi-vocal analogue for the contemporaneous domicides 
occurring in the personal, social, political and spiritual systems of the 
present. We may speculate without great imagination that this gradual 
onslaught of meaninglessness will―in the absence of a new sacred 
canopy―continue to threaten and infect us for the foreseeable future.2
2  This book is situated within a more encompassing argument, presented in Buddhism 
and Cognitive Science: Responding to the Meaning Crisis, University of Toronto. 
Available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uc8wy_4H8X8
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